Metacognition and Mindreading: One system or two?

元认知和读心术：一个系统还是两个系统？

• 批准号: ES/M009890/1
• 负责人: David Williams
• 金额: $ 35.51万
• 依托单位: University of Kent
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2015 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FM009890%2F1
• 关键词: Metacognition; Mindreading; system; two

Intuitively, we are aware of our own thoughts in a way that is quite different to the way that we are aware of other people's thoughts; each of us is privileged in knowing only our own thoughts directly, whereas we have to *infer* others' thoughts on the basis of their overt behaviour. The ability to monitor one's own thoughts is termed "metacognition", whereas the ability to monitor others' thoughts is termed "mindreading". The intuitive view of metacognition described above has led some (so-called "two systems" theorists) to claim that distinct psychological mechanisms underpin metacognition and mindreading, and that metacognition is evolutionarily and developmentally prior to mindreading. This claim is disputed by another group of ("one-system") theorists who argue that mindreading and metacognition actually rely on exactly the same core psychological mechanism (despite common intuition), and that metacognition actually emerged as a by-product of the evolutionary need to mind-read others. Two-systems theorists use two potentially powerful arguments to support their view. First, they argue that non-human primates are capable of performing well on tests of metacognition even though such primates show little evidence of mindreading ability. Second, they argue that humans with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show intact metacognitive ability despite impaired mindreading. If these arguments are validated, then this would rule out the one-system view of the relation between mindreading and metacognition. However, one-system theorists have challenged these arguments, claiming that (a) the supposedly metacognitive tasks that non-human primates perform well on do not, in fact, require metacognitive awareness, and (b) people with ASD *do* show metacognitive impairments. There is, however, very little empirical research to decide between these arguments and counter-arguments. Therefore, the aim of our proposed research is to test these theories in a systematic fashion by employing multiple kinds of metacognitive task across two sets of experiments.In the first set of experiments, we will manipulate the demands of metacognitive tasks in systematic ways to establish whether the kinds of task used to test metacognition in non-human primates really do require awareness of one's own thoughts. Neurotypical adults will take part in this set of studies.In the second set of experiments, we will assess metacognitive monitoring among adults with ASD and neurotypical adults who are closely similar to participants with ASD in terms of age and general intelligence. We will use a variety of tasks, including those kinds that are used to test metacognition in non-human primates. Together, these experiments will allow us to decide between the competing theories of the relation between metacognition and mindreading. In addition to supporting theory development, our proposed research will be important in understanding the nature of cognitive functioning in people with ASD. It is striking how little research there is into metacognition in ASD, given that many hundreds of studies that have explored mindreading in this disorder. Indeed, difficulties with such *self*-awareness might explain aspects of the behavioural features of ASD that difficulties with mindreading do not so easily explain (e.g., behavioural inflexibility). Thus, we hope that our proposed research will, in the end, have practical benefits for people with ASD, by informing teaching practices and intervention efforts designed to enhance learning and cognitive-behavioural functioning among people with this disorder.

从直觉上讲，我们以与我们意识到他人思想的方式完全不同的方式意识到自己的思想。我们每个人都只能直接了解自己的思想，而我们必须 *推断出其他人的思想基于公开的行为。监视自己的想法的能力被称为“元认知”，而监视他人思想的能力则称为“思维阅读”。上述元认知的直观观点导致了一些（所谓的“两个系统”理论家）声称具有元认知和思维的独特心理机制，并且元认知在进行思维之前是进化和发展。这一主张是由另一组（“一代”）理论家提出的，他们认为思维读物和元认知实际上依赖于完全相同的核心心理机制（尽管有共同的直觉），并且元认知实际上是作为进化需要的副产品而出现的。两系统理论家使用两个潜在的强大论点来支持他们的观点。首先，他们认为非人类灵长类动物能够在元认知测试上表现出色，即使这些灵长类动物几乎没有任何精神阅读能力的证据。其次，他们认为，尽管思维障碍受损，但患有自闭症谱系障碍（ASD）的人（ASD）表现出完整的元认知能力。如果这些论点得到了验证，那么这将排除思维和元认知之间关系的一代观点。但是，一代理论家对这些论点提出了挑战，声称（a）非人类灵长类动物的表现良好的据称元认知任务实际上并不需要元认知意识，以及（b）ASD * do * do * do * do *显示元认知障碍的人。但是，在这些论点和反对意见之间做出的实证研究很少。因此，我们提出的研究的目的是通过在两组实验中采用多种元认知任务来以系统的方式测试这些理论。在第一组实验中，我们将以系统的方式操纵元认知任务的要求，以确定在非人类灵长类动物中测试元认知是否确实需要一种想法，这是一种想法。神经型成年人将参加这组研究。在第二组实验中，我们将评估与ASD和神经型成人成年人的元认知监测，他们在年龄和一般智能方面与ASD的参与者非常相似。我们将使用各种任务，包括用于测试非人类灵长类动物元认知的类型。这些实验将使我们能够在元认知与思维读物之间的关系的竞争理论之间做出决定。除了支持理论发展外，我们提出的研究对于理解ASD患者认知功能的性质将很重要。鉴于数百种研究探索了这种疾病的思维方式的研究，对ASD的元认知的研究很少。确实，这种 *自我 *意识的困难可能解释了ASD的行为特征的各个方面，即精神阅读的困难并不能那么容易解释（例如，行为僵化）。因此，我们希望我们拟议的研究最终将通过向旨在增强这种疾病患者的学习和认知行为功能的教学实践和干预措施来告知教学实践和干预措施，从而对患有ASD的人有实际好处。

项目成果

The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education.

提问的孩子：心理学和教育的见解。

• 发表时间: 2020
• 作者: Peter Carruthers

Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations.

• DOI: 10.1037/xge0000878
• 发表时间: 2021-03
• 期刊: Journal of experimental psychology. General
• 作者: Nicholson T;Williams DM;Lind SE;Grainger C;Carruthers P
• 通讯作者: Carruthers P

Comparative metacognition

• DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.08.2019
• 发表时间: 2019-11
• 期刊: Animal Behavior and Cognition
• 作者: P. Carruthers;David M Williams

Lind, Sophie E. and Williams, David M. and Grainger, Catherine and Landsiedel, Julia

索菲·E·林德 (Lind) 和大卫·威廉姆斯 (David M.) 以及凯瑟琳·格兰杰 (Grainger) 和朱莉娅·兰西德尔 (Landsiedel)

• 作者: Lind, Sophie E.;Williams, David M.;Grainger, Catherine;Landsiedel, J
• 通讯作者: Landsiedel, J

Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1262536
• 发表时间: 2017-01-01
• 期刊: PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
• 影响因子: 1.4
• 作者: Carruthers, Peter