A Universalist Philosophy of Mind

普遍主义心灵哲学

• 批准号: EP/X023419/1
• 负责人: Brice Bantegnie
• 金额: $ 34.36万
• 依托单位: University of Southampton
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FX023419%2F1
• 关键词: Universalist; Philosophy; Mind

Philosophers traditionally distinguish between particulars (entities which can be counted), and universals (entities which are the common natures in which these particulars partake) - contrast, e.g., the table with the property of being gray. The core assumption of philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition is a conception of mental states (e.g. beliefs, emotions) as mental particulars. This assumption has never been argued for. The ambition of UNIPHIMIND is to provide the first full defense of the universalist thesis, according to which mental states are universals or instantiations thereof. It will do so by drawing the full implications of the universalist thesis for philosophy of mind and by tracing the history of the adoption of the particularist assumption, thereby breaking new grounds. The overarching goal of UNIPHIMIND is to show that these implications are deep and far-ranging.

哲学家传统上区分细节（可以计算的实体）和普遍性（这些细节所参与的常见实体） - 对比，例如，桌子具有灰色的属性。分析传统中心理哲学的核心假设是对心理状态（例如信仰，情感）的概念。这个假设从未得到争论。单人心的野心是为普遍主义论文提供第一个充分的辩护，据此，精神状态是普遍性或实例化。它将通过借鉴普遍主义论文对心理哲学的全部含义，并追溯采用特殊主义假设的历史，从而破坏新的理由来做到这一点。 Uniphimind的总体目标是表明这些含义是深刻而远大的。