Emerging Themes in 21st Century meta-ethics: Evaluative and Normative Language

21 世纪元伦理学的新兴主题：评价性语言和规范性语言

基本信息

批准号：
AH/J008648/1
负责人：
Michael Ridge
金额：
$ 3.47万
依托单位：
University of Edinburgh
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2012 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FJ008648%2F1
关键词：
Emerging Themes 21st Century meta

项目摘要

This research network will be a stimulus for new directions in the study of normative and evaluative language. Normative and evaluative language includes words like 'good', 'bad', 'desirable', 'unfair', 'ought', 'must', and 'should'. Over the past decade there has been a clear trend in the direction of exploring so-called hybrid theories in meta-ethics. According to these theories, these words both describe their subject and express evaluative attitudes towards it. Unfortunately, those working on such theories have given little sustained attention to other words that seem to be capable of simultaneously describing a subject and expressing evaluative attitudes towards it (slurs and pejorative language for example). This is a shortcoming because an understanding of how these words work will be of great interest to meta-ethics in determining whether normative and evaluative language functions in this same dual manner.A second aspect of the narrow focus of previous work in meta-ethics is that philosophers have tended to only focus on how normative and evaluative language functions when used in centrally ethical contexts. Thus, for example, philosophers working on the ethical 'must' have tended to ignore how it relates to the 'must' that appears in claims about possibility and necessity. Sometimes this narrow focus was based on the assumption that the terms used in ethics have unique meanings. But other times the assumption goes unnoticed.Recently some metaethicists, including those we plan to involve in this network, have challenged this assumption by looking at how these terms work when used in non-ethical discourse. It has also come from people working in other areas of philosophy and in linguistics who have started to examine features such as context-sensitivity and attitude expression and their application to normative and evaluative terms and other expressions. This has led to a broadening in focus from meta-ethics to the meta-normative, as philosophers become interested in and attuned to the non-ethical uses of these terms, and an increasing awareness that the work in philosophy of language and linguistics should be brought to bear upon meta-ethical questions.This research network will be a stimulus for new directions in the study of normative and evaluative language. Some of the key research questions and themes are:(1) Normative judgements (e.g. judgements that torture is wrong) seem quite different from non-normative judgements (e.g. judgements that the table is round). But what makes them distinctive? Is it their subject matter, the role they play in thinking and action, or something else? Are they beliefs, or desires, some combination of the two, or something else?(2) Normative utterances (e.g. assertions of 'torture is wrong') seem quite different from non-normative utterances (e.g. assertions that Paris is the capital of France). Does this difference warrant treating their meaning as being of a different sort from more prosaically factual kinds of utterances?(3) If normative judgements somehow combine beliefs and desires, or if the meaning of normative utterances is somehow different from the kind of meaning that prosaically factual statements have, do slurs and pejorative language provide a useful parallel for normative judgements and claims? But are there features of pejorative terms that undermine this parallel?(4) How do normative judgements relate to modal judgements (judgements about possibility and necessity). For example, is there any connection between the respective uses of 'must' in 'you must treat people fairly' and 'everything that goes up must come down', or the respective uses of 'cannot' in 'you cannot treat people like this' and 'electrons cannot travel faster than the speed of light'.

该研究网络将刺激规范性和评价性语言研究的新方向。规范性和评价性语言包括“好”、“坏”、“理想”、“不公平”、“应该”、“必须”和“应该”等词语。在过去的十年里，探索元伦理学中所谓的混合理论的方向出现了明显的趋势。根据这些理论，这些词既描述了其主题，又表达了对其主题的评价态度。不幸的是，那些研究这些理论的人很少持续关注其他似乎能够同时描述一个主题并表达对其的评价态度的词语（例如诽谤和贬义语言）。这是一个缺点，因为元伦理学在确定规范性语言和评价性语言是否以同样的双重方式发挥作用时，对这些词如何工作的理解将非常感兴趣。元伦理学先前工作的狭隘关注的第二个方面是哲学家往往只关注规范性和评价性语言在集中伦理背景下使用时如何发挥作用。因此，例如，研究伦理“必须”的哲学家往往会忽视它与出现在关于可能性和必然性的主张中的“必须”的关系。有时，这种狭隘的关注是基于这样的假设：道德中使用的术语具有独特的含义。但有时这个假设会被忽视。最近，一些元伦理学家，包括我们计划参与这个网络的那些人，通过研究这些术语在非伦理话语中使用时的工作原理来挑战这个假设。它还来自哲学和语言学其他领域的工作人员，他们开始研究语境敏感性和态度表达等特征及其在规范性和评价性术语及其他表达中的应用。这导致焦点从元伦理学扩展到元规范，因为哲学家对这些术语的非伦理用途产生了兴趣并适应了这些术语，并且越来越意识到语言哲学和语言学的工作应该是这个研究网络将刺激规范性和评价性语言研究的新方向。一些关键的研究问题和主题是：（1）规范性判断（例如酷刑是错误的判断）似乎与非规范性判断（例如桌子是圆的判断）有很大不同。但是什么让它们与众不同呢？是他们的主题、他们在思考和行动中扮演的角色，还是其他什么？它们是信仰、欲望、两者的某种组合，还是其他什么？（2）规范性话语（例如“酷刑是错误的”的断言）似乎与非规范性话语（例如巴黎是法国首都的断言）有很大不同）。这种差异是否值得将它们的含义视为与更平淡的事实性话语不同的一种？（3）如果规范性判断以某种方式结合了信念和欲望，或者如果规范性话语的含义在某种程度上与平淡无奇的含义有所不同事实陈述有，诽谤和贬义语言是否为规范性判断和主张提供了有用的相似之处？但贬义词的某些特征是否会破坏这种相似性？（4）规范性判断与模态判断（关于可能性和必要性的判断）如何相关。例如，“你必须公平对待人们”中的“必须”和“凡是上升的必然下降”中的“必须”的各自用法之间是否存在任何联系，或者“你不能这样对待人”中的“不能”的各自用法之间是否有任何联系？ ”和“电子的传播速度不能超过光速”。