PENSION PLAN PROVISIONS AND EARLY RETIREMENT EXTENSION

养老金计划条款和提前退休延期

• 批准号: 2050061
• 负责人: DAVID A WISE
• 金额: $ 14.66万
• 依托单位: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-01-09 至 1998-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/2050061
• 关键词: disability insurance; epidemiology; human middle age (35-64); human subject; income maintenance; retirement; social model

Americans are living longer, yet they are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages. Possible improvements in health status would suggest the reverse. Firm pension plans, however, tend to encourage early retirement. The central goal of this continuing research is to estimate the effect of private pension plan provisions on retirement. A particular component of this general goal is to estimate the effect of special early retirement incentives, often called "window" plans. A related goal is to estimate the effect on Social Security net costs of the early retirement induced by private pension plan provisions. To accomplish this long-term objective, the research has several specific aims: (1) To document that pension plan provisions that provide an incentive to retire early do indeed induce departure from the firm. (2) To complete the development and testing of a statistical model that is tailored to the analysis of retirement behavior. The model is forward looking in that it accounts for large jumps or drops in pension wealth that will occur if work continues. At the same time, it accounts for changes in the circumstances and alternatives of individuals as they age. (3) To use the model to estimate the relationship between pension plan provisions and retirement in several different firms. (4) To test the model by predicting the retirement effect of "natural experiments" that are occasioned by special and unforeseen early retirement incentive programs. (5) To predict the effect on retirement of potential changes in the pension plan provisions. An example is the effect of increasing the age of early retirement in a firm from 55 to 60. Retirement in large numbers might then begin at 60 instead of 55, reducing substantially retirement rates between 55 and 60. (6) To estimate the relationship between retirement induced by corporate pension plan provisions and the net cost to the Social Security system. This involves evaluation of the interaction between Social Security provisions and private pension plan provisions, to estimate the magnitude of the effects of each on retirement. (7) To determine how private pension and Social Security provisions could be made consistent with respect to the retirement incentives that they present. The analysis will be based on personnel data collected from several individual firms. The empirical specification is a continuous time model in which the option value of not retiring plays a key role. The model captures the advantages of both non-linear budget constraint and continuous time hazard models.

美国人的寿命更长，但他们正在离开劳动力 年轻时。 健康可能改善 状态将暗示相反。 但是，公司的养老金计划 倾向于鼓励提前退休。 这个中心目标 继续研究是估计私人退休金的影响 关于退休的计划规定。 这个特定组成部分 一般目标是估计特殊提前退休的影响 激励措施，通常称为“窗口”计划。 一个相关的目标是 估计对早期社会保障净成本的影响 由私人退休金计划规定引起的退休。 到 实现这一长期目标，研究有几个 具体目的： （1）记录提供的养老金计划规定 提前退休的动机确实确实诱使离开公司。 （2）完成统计的开发和测试 定制为分析退休行为的模型。 这 模型正在向前看，它是大跳跃或 如果工作继续进行，将会发生养老金财富。 在 同时，它解释了情况的变化 个体随着年龄的增长的替代方案。 （3）使用模型估计养老金之间的关系 计划规定和退休在几个不同的公司中。 （4）通过预测的退休效应来测试模型 特殊且无法预见的“自然实验” 提前退休激励计划。 （5）预测对潜在变化退休的影响 退休金计划规定。 一个例子是 将一家公司的早期退休年龄从55增加到60。 大量退休可能从60而不是55开始， 在55到60之间，大大降低了退休率。 （6）估计由 公司退休金计划规定和社会净成本 安全系统。 这涉及对互动的评估 在社会保障规定和私人退休金计划之间 规定，以估计每个人对 退休。 （7）确定私人退休金和社会保障如何 可以在退休方面保持一致的规定 他们提出的激励措施。 分析将基于 从几家公司收集的人员数据。 这 经验规范是一个连续的时间模型 不退休的期权价值起着关键作用。 模型捕获 非线性预算限制和连续的优势 时间危险模型。