Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in an International Oligopolisitic Market

国际寡头垄断市场横向兼并的经济分析

基本信息

批准号：
23730226
负责人：
NAKAMURA Yasuhiko
金额：
$ 0.75万
依托单位：
Nihon University (2013)Gunma University (2011-2012)
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2011 至 2012
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

We analyzed horizontal mergers in domestic and international oligopolistic markets. First, we conducted the analysis on domestic mergers among firms which are located in the same countries, which becomes the basis on the theoretical analysis of international mergers among firms which are located in different countries. In the analysis of the domestic mergers, we focused on the influences of wage bargaining within each firm on the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. In the analysis of international mergers, we attempted to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred structure with respect to each country's social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge with each other in an international oligopoly.

我们分析了国内和国际寡头垄断市场的横向合并。首先，我们对位于同一国家的企业之间的国内并购进行了分析，这成为不同国家企业之间的国际并购的理论分析基础。在对国内并购的分析中，我们从生产率不对称企业工会寡头垄断的社会福利角度，重点关注各企业内部工资谈判对均衡所有权结构与最优先所有权结构之间关系的影响。资本。在对国际并购的分析中，我们试图阐明均衡市场结构与每个国家的社会福利和/或社会总福利的最优先结构之间的关系，此时所有现有企业都可以自由地相互合并。国际寡头垄断。

项目成果

期刊论文数量（0）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Capacity Choice in a Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly: The Relative Performance Approach

定价混合双头垄断中的容量选择：相对性能方法

DOI：
10.4236/me.2013.44031
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
Modern Economy
影响因子：
0
作者：
Fukugawa;N.;Yasuhiko Nakamura and Masayuki Saito
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura and Masayuki Saito

Wage Bargaining and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs

成本不对称的工资谈判和合并激励

DOI：
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
Bulletin of Economic Research
影响因子：
0.8
作者：
Kentaro Nakajima;Yukiko Umeno Saito;and Iichiro Uesugi;Kenta Goto and Tamaki Endo;Nobuya Fukugawa;Yasuhiko Nakamura
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura

Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs

就管理委派合同和不对称成本的合并激励进行谈判