Theoretical Investigation on R&D Investment and Oligopolistic Models with Spillovers

R理论研究

• 批准号: 14530011
• 负责人: HARUNA Shoji
• 金额: $ 0.83万
• 依托单位: OKAYAMA UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2002 至 2003
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-14530011/
• 关键词: R&D investment; Spillover; Cournot oligopoly model; Bertrand Oligopoly model; Catel; Optimal trade policy; Two-stage game model; 貿易政策; R & D; グールノー・モデル; ベルトラン・モデル; ディスクロージャー政策; R＆D; export; spillover; trade policy; duopoly; investment; t

1. Whether or not the government with export firms employs export subsidies as trade policy depends on both levels of R&D spillover and the relative cost of R&D investment. For example, when either the relative cost is high or it is not so high and the spillover level is relatively large, the otimal trade policy is laisser-faaire or export tax : namely, the possibility depends on both levels. Export subsidies cause the promotion of export and R&D investment to increase.the strategic model with R&D investment in the presence of its spillover as well as for the nonstrategic model. Moreover, although whether or not firms under Cournot-quantity competition use RED investment strategically depends on the level of spillover, the incentive for firms under Bertrand-price competition to use R&D is small.3. Whether firms disclose their results created by R&D depends on the sign of the cross price effect in terms of a demand function, irrespective of whether the firms are involved in quantity or price competition in the market. Moreover, the formation of an R&D cartel of oligopolistic firms will increase both R&D expenditure and profits. When products are substitutes, firms under quantity competition will obtain more in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it.

1. 拥有出口企业的政府是否将出口补贴作为贸易政策取决于研发溢出水平和研发投资的相对成本。例如，当相对成本较高或不太高且溢出水平较大时，最优的贸易政策是自由放任或出口税：即可能性取决于两个水平。出口补贴导致出口促进和研发投资增加。具有溢出效应的研发投资战略模型与非战略模型一样。此外，尽管古诺数量竞争下的企业是否战略性地使用RED投资取决于溢出水平，但伯特兰价格竞争下的企业使用R&D的动力很小。3．企业是否披露其研发成果取决于需求函数中交叉价格效应的符号，无论企业是否参与市场的数量竞争或价格竞争。此外，寡头垄断企业研发卡特尔的形成将增加研发支出和利润。当产品具有替代性时，处于数量竞争中的企业在有研发合作的情况下会比没有研发合作的情况下获得更多的利益。

项目成果

Haruna, Shoji: "Trade Policy under a Duopoly and R&D with Spillovers"The International Economy, Screening Series. No.8. 3-20 (2003)

Haruna, Shoji：“双寡头垄断下的贸易政策和 R

Haruna, Shoji: "Disclosure Policy, and Competition and Cartelization in R&D : Cournot and Bertrand Competition."Okayama Economic Review. 35. 1-25 (2004)

Haruna, Shoji：“R 中的披露政策、竞争和卡特尔化”

春名 章二: "Disclosure Policy, and Competition and Cartelization in R&D : Cournot and Bertrand Competition"岡山大学経済学会雑誌. 35巻4号. 1-25 (2004)

Shoji Haruna：“研发中的披露政策、竞争和卡特尔化：古诺和伯特兰竞争”冈山大学经济学会杂志，第 35 卷，第 4. 1-25 期（2004 年）。

Haruna, Shoji: "Trade policy under a duopoly and R&D with spillovers"International economy, screening series(国際経済、投稿号). (近刊). (2003)

Haruna, Shoji：“双头垄断下的贸易政策和具有溢出效应的研发”，国际经济，放映系列（即将出版）。

Haruna, Shoji: "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Cournot and Bertrand Duopolles with Spillovers, and Their Comparison"岡山大学経済学会雑誌. 34. 1-18 (2002)

Haruna, Shoji：“Cournot 和 Bertrand Duopolles 的合作与非合作 R&D 及其溢出效应及其比较”冈山大学经济学会杂志 34. 1-18 (2002)。