A Game Theoretical Analysis of Cooperation and Coalition Formation

合作与联盟形成的博弈论分析

• 批准号: 13630009
• 负责人: OKADA Akira
• 金额: $ 1.92万
• 依托单位: Kyoto University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2001 至 2003
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13630009/
• 关键词: game theory; cooperation; coalition formation; bargaining; evolutionary game; Nash equilibrium; global warming; Kyoto protocol; 組織; 交渉ゲーム

The aim of this research is to investigate conditions and mechanisms for voluntary cooperation and coalition formation among economic agents pursuing their own values, by applying new methodologies in game theory. The research consists of the following three topics about voluntary cooperation and coalition formation.(1) noncooperative bargaining models for cooperation and coalition formationWe present a noncooperative sequential bargaining model for a general n-person strategic game where cooperation by a group of players may induce externality to other players. We first define a new notion of the core, called the Nash core, of the n-person strategic game. The Nash-core is defined by a new notion of effectiveness of a payoff allocation, which is based on the idea that when a coalition forms, a response by, the compliment coalition should be consistent with the Nash bargaining solution of their negotiations. We prove that the largest group of players forms in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining model if and only if the Nash bargaining solution of the game belongs to the Nash core. Moreover, negotiations result in the Nash bargaining solution outcome. We design and conduct bargaining experiments to test theoretical predictions. We show that bargaining outcomes of coalition formation are substantially influenced by reciprocal behavior of subjects.(2) evolutionary analysis of group formationWe present an evolutionary game model for group formation in the collective action problem and investigate how heterogeneous preferences affect a long-run equilibrium for group formation.(3) economic applicationsWe apply theoretical models developed in the research to international negotiations on climate change in the Kyoto protocol. We investigate how noncooperative bargaining models can explain the C02 emissions reduction agreed in the Kyoto protocol, based on actual data about emissions by EU, Former Soviet Union, Japan and USA.

本研究的目的是通过应用博弈论中的新方法来研究追求自身价值的经济主体之间自愿合作和联盟形成的条件和机制。该研究包括以下三个关于自愿合作和联盟形成的主题。（1）合作和联盟形成的非合作讨价还价模型我们针对一般的n人战略博弈提出了一种非合作顺序讨价还价模型，其中一组参与者的合作可能会引起外部性给其他玩家。我们首先定义一个新的核心概念，称为n人策略博弈的纳什核心。纳什核心是由一种新的收益分配有效性概念来定义的，该概念基于这样的思想：当联盟形成时，恭维联盟的回应应该与其谈判的纳什讨价还价解决方案一致。我们证明，当且仅当博弈的纳什讨价还价解属于纳什核心时，最大的玩家群体在平稳子博弈中形成讨价还价模型的完美均衡。而且，谈判产生纳什讨价还价解决方案的结果。我们设计并进行讨价还价实验来测试理论预测。我们表明，联盟形成的讨价还价结果在很大程度上受到主体互惠行为的影响。（2）群体形成的进化分析我们提出了集体行动问题中群体形成的进化博弈模型，并研究异质偏好如何影响长期均衡(3)经济应用我们将研究中发展的理论模型应用到《京都议定书》中关于气候变化的国际谈判中。我们根据欧盟、前苏联、日本和美国的实际排放数据，研究非合作讨价还价模型如何解释《京都议定书》中商定的二氧化碳减排量。