Game Theoretical Foundation of Collusion : Factors other than self-interests and role of private information

共谋的博弈论基础：自身利益以外的因素和私人信息的作用

• 批准号: 15330036
• 负责人: MATSUSHIMA Hitoshi
• 金额: $ 6.59万
• 依托单位: The University of Tokyo
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2003 至 2005
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15330036/
• 关键词: Implementation; Mechanism design; Moral Preference; Auction; Market Microstructure; Detail-Free Mechanism; Incentive; Game Theory; mechanism design; implementation; honesty; market microstructure; group incentive; repeated games; Nash equili

I investigated the possibility of collusion and competition by using the approaches of mechanism design and repeated games. I took into account explicitly the fact that real individuals do not necessarily behave for their own material interests, the fact that they are influenced by information about factors irrelevant to their material interests, and the fact that they use private information and are limited to access public information. The most important contributions are the paper entitled "Repeated Games with Private monitoring : Two Players," which was published in Econometrica as a regular article and the paper entitled "Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance", which was accepted in Journal of Economic Theory as a regular article. Both journals are top among the economics theory journals. Other papers such as "Role of Honesty in Implementation" is related to the issue of the problem of factors other than the material interests. The papers entitled "Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rationality", which was published in Japanese Economic Review, was written as the lecture article for the Nakahana Awards of the Japanese economic association.

我通过机制设计和重复博弈的方法研究了共谋和竞争的可能性。我明确地考虑到，真实的个人行为不一定是为了自己的物质利益，他们会受到与其物质利益无关的因素的信息的影响，他们使用私人信息并仅限于获取公共信息。信息。最重要的贡献是在《Econometrica》上作为常规文章发表的题为“Repeated Games with PrivateMonitoring : Two Players”的论文和题为“Mechanism Design with Side Payments: individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance”的论文，该论文被接受经济理论杂志作为常规文章。这两本期刊都是经济学理论期刊中的顶尖期刊。其他论文如《诚实在实施中的作用》则涉及物质利益以外的因素问题。发表在《日本经济评论》上的题为“Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rational”的论文，被撰写为日本经济协会中花奖的演讲文章。

项目成果

Book Review : "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare I, edited by K.Arrow, A.Sen, and K.Suzumura, Elsevier, 2002".

书评：“社会选择与福利手册 I，由 K.Arrow、A.Sen 和 K.Suzumura 编辑，爱思唯尔，2002 年”。

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Literature 42
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima

ナッシュは何を見たか : 純粋数学とゲーム理論

纳什看到了什么纯数学和博弈论？

• 发表时间: 2005
• 作者: 松島斉;落合卓四郎 翻訳(H. W.クーン;S.ナサー著)
• 通讯作者: S.ナサー著)

モデルの細部から独立なメカニズムデザインと合理性について : 平成16年度日本経済学会第10回中原賞授賞記念講演

论独立于模型细节的机制设计和合理性：纪念2004年第10届日本经济协会中原奖的演讲

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 現代経済学の潮流2005(東洋経済新報社) 10巻
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉
• 通讯作者: 松島斉

Hitoshi Matsushima: "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring : Two Players"Econometrica. 72巻3号(forth coming). (2004)

Hitoshi Matsushima：“私人监控的重复游戏：两个玩家”《计量经济学》第 72 卷，第 3 期（即将出版）。

Large Market Design in Dominance

大市场设计占据主导地位

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series, University of Tokyo, CIRJE F-346
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima