Game Theoretical Foundation of Collusion : Factors other than self-interests and role of private information

共谋的博弈论基础：自身利益以外的因素和私人信息的作用

• 批准号: 15330036
• 负责人: MATSUSHIMA Hitoshi
• 金额: $ 6.59万
• 依托单位: The University of Tokyo
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2003 至 2005
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15330036/
• 关键词: Implementation; Mechanism design; Moral Preference; Auction; Market Microstructure; Detail-Free Mechanism; Incentive; Game Theory; mechanism design; implementation; honesty; market microstructure; group incentive; repeated games; Nash equili

I investigated the possibility of collusion and competition by using the approaches of mechanism design and repeated games. I took into account explicitly the fact that real individuals do not necessarily behave for their own material interests, the fact that they are influenced by information about factors irrelevant to their material interests, and the fact that they use private information and are limited to access public information. The most important contributions are the paper entitled "Repeated Games with Private monitoring : Two Players," which was published in Econometrica as a regular article and the paper entitled "Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance", which was accepted in Journal of Economic Theory as a regular article. Both journals are top among the economics theory journals. Other papers such as "Role of Honesty in Implementation" is related to the issue of the problem of factors other than the material interests. The papers entitled "Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rationality", which was published in Japanese Economic Review, was written as the lecture article for the Nakahana Awards of the Japanese economic association.

我通过使用机制设计和重复游戏的方法来研究勾结和竞争的可能性。我明确考虑了一个事实，即真实个人不一定要以自己的物质利益行事，这一事实受到与其物质利益无关的因素的信息的影响，以及他们使用私人信息并仅限于访问公共信息的事实。最重要的贡献是题为“带有私人监控的重复游戏：两名玩家”的论文，该论文作为常规文章发表在《计量经济学》中，题为“带有附带付款的机制设计：个人合理性和迭代性优势”的论文，在经济理论杂志上被接受为常规文章。这两种期刊都是经济学理论期刊中的佼佼者。其他论文，例如“诚实在实施中的作用”，与材料利益以外的其他因素问题问题有关。日本经济评论中发表的题为“无细节机制设计与理性”的论文被写为日本经济协会中纳卡哈纳奖的演讲文章。

项目成果

ナッシュは何を見たか : 純粋数学とゲーム理論

纳什看到了什么纯数学和博弈论？

• 发表时间: 2005
• 作者: 松島斉;落合卓四郎 翻訳(H. W.クーン;S.ナサー著)
• 通讯作者: S.ナサー著)

モデルの細部から独立なメカニズムデザインと合理性について : 平成16年度日本経済学会第10回中原賞授賞記念講演

论独立于模型细节的机制设计和合理性：纪念2004年第10届日本经济协会中原奖的演讲

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 現代経済学の潮流2005(東洋経済新報社) 10巻
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉
• 通讯作者: 松島斉

Book Review : "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare I, edited by K.Arrow, A.Sen, and K.Suzumura, Elsevier, 2002".

书评：“社会选择与福利手册 I，由 K.Arrow、A.Sen 和 K.Suzumura 编辑，爱思唯尔，2002 年”。

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Literature 42
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima

Hitoshi Matsushima: "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring : Two Players"Econometrica. 72巻3号(forth coming). (2004)

Hitoshi Matsushima：“私人监控的重复游戏：两个玩家”《计量经济学》第 72 卷，第 3 期（即将出版）。

Large Market Design in Dominance

大市场设计占据主导地位

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series, University of Tokyo, CIRJE F-346
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima