Indirect Tax Competition and Harmonization in Europe

欧洲的间接税竞争与协调

基本信息

批准号：
14402012
负责人：
OHSAWA Yoshiaki
金额：
$ 3.39万
依托单位：
University of Tsukuba
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of this project is to investigate the actual sales tax competition and harmonization in Europe, which is one of the most important economic problems in Europe. Based on the investigation in European countries such as Principality of Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Austria, we can formulate more realistic and more essential model using Nash game equilibrium. For this, we explicitly take account of mobility, cross-border shoppers, geographical variables such as country sizes and locations, and tax policy of EU (European Union).In this year, in order to focus on the mobility extension in the world, we examine empirically and theoretically how the country size and location affect the tax rates and tax revenues. We visit some European small and interior countries and construct simple Nash equilibrium models. First, we examine the actual tax competition and harmonization in Principality of Liechtenstein which is regarded as tax heaven by OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Second, we survey the international papers on spaceless tax competition models in addition to spatial tax competition models. Third, we model tax competition in two-dimensional space using Voronoi diagrams which is fundamental tool in computational geometry. Also, we develop the model in the network and apply it to Japanese tax competition after introducing decentralization of authority. Finally, we publish partially our result in Japanese book, i.e., Introduction to Optimization in Architecture, edited by Architectural Institute of Japan.

该项目的目的是调查欧洲实际的营业税竞争和协调，这是欧洲最重要的经济问题之一。根据欧洲国家，瑞士和奥地利公国等欧洲国家的调查，我们可以使用NASH游戏均衡制定更现实，更重要的模型。为此，我们明确考虑出口，跨境购物者，诸如国家规模和地点等地理变量以及欧盟（欧盟）的税收政策。我们从经验和理论上检查国家规模和位置如何影响税率和税收收入。我们参观了一些欧洲小型和内部国家，并构建了简单的NASH平衡模型。首先，我们研究了OECD（经合经济合作与发展组织）认为列支敦士登公国的实际税收竞争和协调。其次，除空间税竞争模型外，我们还调查了国际无间隔税竞争模型的国际论文。第三，我们使用Voronoi图在二维空间中对税收竞争进行建模，这是计算几何学中的基本工具。此外，我们在网络中开发了该模型，并在引入权威权力下放后将其应用于日本税收竞争。最后，我们在日本书籍中部分发表了我们的结果，即日本建筑学院的建筑优化概论。