Democratic Legitimacy in the EU: Inside the 'Black Box' of Informal Trilogies

欧盟的民主合法性：非正式三部曲的“黑匣子”内部

基本信息

批准号：
278408068
负责人：
Dr. Sofia Pagliarin, since 3/2020
金额：
--
依托单位：
Aberdeen Business School
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2016
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2015-12-31 至 2019-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/278408068?language=en
关键词：
Democratic Legitimacy EU Inside Black

项目摘要

Can the EU govern efficiently and with the people? Almost all EU legislation is now agreed in an early stage, facilitated by informal 'trilogue' negotiations in which a small number of representatives of three EU institutions bargain behind closed doors and present the agreement for approval in public meetings. We examine the complex dynamics of this 'black box' and assess the ability of EU institutions to bargain successfully, to foster or preclude political contestation, to create political coalitions across institutions, and avoid capture by special interests. We do this by combining, first, a comprehensive, large-scale analysis of patterns of trilogue negotiations, tracing systematically the evolution of Council and EP preferences in order to determine their respective bargaining success (package 1); second, in-depth process-tracing studies to explore what happens when issues with high political stakes enter the world of trilogues, i.e we examine the conditions under which informal trilogues affect bargaining success by looking at intra- and extra-institutional actors and their strategies to manage information flows (package 2) and explore how both mainstream and Eurosceptic and/or radical political groups mediate cross-institutional contestation (package 3). A fourth section (package 4) will bring these findings together to explain how patterns of contestation affect the evolution of preferences during the course of legislative negotiations.

欧盟可以有效地与人民同行吗？现在，几乎所有欧盟立法都在早期阶段达成共识，这是由非正式的“三路易斯”谈判所促进的，在闭门造车后面，欧盟三个机构的少数代表都在封闭之后，并颁发了公开会议批准的协议。我们研究了这个“黑匣子”的复杂动态，并评估欧盟成功算法，促进或排除政治竞争，跨机构建立政治联盟的能力，并避免以特殊利益的方式占领政治联盟。首先，我们结合了对三路径谈判模式的全面，大规模的分析，系统地追踪理事会和EP偏好的进化，以确定其各自的议价成功（包1）；其次，深入的过程追踪研究以探讨当具有高政治问题的问题进入三角形的世界时会发生什么，即，我们检查了非正式三角形的条件，即通过查看机构内部和外部机构演员及其策略来影响讨价还价的成功。管理信息流（套餐2），并探讨主流和欧洲怀疑论和/或激进政治团体如何调解跨机构的竞争（套餐3）。第四部分（4个包）将把这些发现汇总在一起，以解释比赛模式如何影响立法谈判过程中偏好的演变。