Collaborative Research: CISE-MSI: RPEP: CPS: A Resilient Cyber-Physical Security Framework for Next-Generation Distributed Energy Resources at Grid Edge

合作研究：CISE-MSI：RPEP：CPS：电网边缘下一代分布式能源的弹性网络物理安全框架

• 批准号: 2219733
• 负责人: Taesic Kim
• 金额: $ 73.74万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M University-Kingsville
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-10-01 至 2025-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2219733&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CISE; MSI; RPEP

This award is funded in whole or in part under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2).Current electric power grid is undergoing transition due to the rapid penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) including renewable energy systems, energy storage systems, and electric vehicles. However, new cybersecurity threats arise. It is still challenging to model and manage a cross-layered security perimeter in multiparty-involved DER systems. Maloperation or malicious control of DERs will be caused by advanced attackers (e.g., hackers and insiders) as seen the real-world attack cases using the expanded attack surfaces. Besides, quantum era is coming soon and it is anticipated that quantum computing attacks will be possible within 5–10 years. In addition, many inverter-based DERs exposed to the public are vulnerable to physical attacks. To address major threats facing the cyber-physical DERs, this project aims to develop a resilient cyber-physical security framework with a collaborative partnership across multidisciplinary team members from two minority serving institutions, Texas A&M University-Kingsville and University of Illinois Chicago, and Sandia National Laboratories. Moreover, this partnership supports an integrative research and education program of the MSIs for training skilled next-generation workforce in the cyber-physical power and energy systems areas.The technical goal of this project is to launch a major research direction to develop an innovative resilient cyber-physical security framework that addresses imminent challenges in both future cyber-physical security requirements and power engineering designs and resilient operational strategies for DER-rich power systems. Specific integrated research thrusts are as follows: (a) developing a blockchain security governance model for DER systems operating under multiparty and system of systems environments; (b) developing a quantum secure DER network by studying a lightweight post quantum cryptography against quantum computing attacks; (c) realizing DER inverter hardware hardening by investigating a new DER smart inverter security design; and (d) achieving controlled resilience at grid edge using event-triggered resilient self-learning control with retrieval strategy ensuring reduced dependency and susceptibility to communication during security breach.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项的全部或部分资金根据《2021 年美国救援计划法案》（公法 117-2）提供。由于包括可再生能源系统、能源等在内的分布式能源 (DER) 的快速渗透，当前电网正在经历转型。然而，在多方参与的 DER 系统中建模和管理跨层安全边界仍然是一项挑战，因为先进的 DER 系统会导致误操作或恶意控制。攻击者（例如黑客和内部人员）看到了使用扩展的攻击面的现实攻击案例。此外，量子时代即将到来，预计量子计算攻击将在 5-10 年内成为可能。暴露于公众的基于逆变器的分布式能源很容易受到物理攻击，为了解决网络物理分布式能源面临的主要威胁，该项目旨在与来自两个少数族裔服务机构的多学科团队成员建立合作伙伴关系，开发一个有弹性的网络物理安全框架。 ，德克萨斯州此外，A&M 大学金斯维尔分校、伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校和桑迪亚国家实验室还支持 MSI 的综合研究和教育计划，以培训网络物理电力和能源系统领域的下一代熟练劳动力。技术目标该项目的主要研究方向是开发一种创新的网络弹性物理安全框架，解决未来网络物理安全需求和电力工程设计以及富含分布式能源的电力系统的弹性运营策略方面迫在眉睫的挑战。推力是具体如下：（a）为多方和系统环境下运行的 DER 系统开发区块链安全治理模型；（b）通过研究针对量子计算攻击的轻量级后量子密码学来开发量子安全 DER 网络；（c）实现 DER 逆变器；通过研究新的 DER 智能逆变器安全设计来强化硬件；(d) 反映使用事件触发的弹性自学习控制和检索策略在电网边缘实现受控弹性，确保减少安全漏洞期间对通信的依赖性和敏感性。通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，NSF 的法定使命被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Blockchain-Integrated Resilient Distributed Energy Resources Management System

区块链集成弹性分布式能源管理系统

• DOI: 10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961046
• 发表时间: 2022-12
• 期刊: and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm
• 作者: Ahmad, Seerin;Ahn, Bohyun;Kim, Taesic;Choi, Jinchun;Chae, Myungsuk;Han, Dongjun;Won, Dongjun
• 通讯作者: Won, Dongjun