CAREER: Backside Protection Against Contactless Optical Attacks on Integrated Circuits in Advanced Technology Nodes

职业：针对先进技术节点中集成电路的非接触式光学攻击的背面保护

• 批准号: 2143591
• 负责人: Navid Asadi
• 金额: $ 49.72万
• 依托单位: University of Florida
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-10-01 至 2027-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2143591&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Backside; Protection; Against; Contactless

Today, the explosive demand for modern Integrated Circuits (ICs) and in particular the system-on-chips (SoCs) in different applications from automobiles to military, and critical infrastructures makes their security of paramount concern. With the advancements in packaging and the need for smaller and more power efficient devices, heterogenous integration becomes more attractive but makes the chip more vulnerable from backside. Existing research studies in this area are limited to few attack surfaces with no comprehensive framework. Current countermeasures are incompatible with the conventional IC and SoC design flow and are expensive in terms of both manufacturing cost and design overhead. The project's novelties are in (1) assessing the security vulnerabilities of modern ICs against “contactless optical attacks from backside” with a holistic security taxonomy and quantitative evaluation methods, and (2) providing a framework to develop proper countermeasures against optical probing attacks at circuit-, material- and packaging-levels. The project's broader importance is in different disciplines from electronics to material science for chip designers and students to better understand the correlation between data traffic in IC and the resulting physical signatures that could be used by an attacker to extract sensitive information through new education materials and advanced instrumentations. This project (1) investigates potential security vulnerabilities of modern ICs to backside optical attacks and develop security metrics to identify the vulnerable modules in a device; (2) develops low area and power overhead circuit-based solutions to detect and/or prevent optical probing, (3) develops material and packaging based countermeasures to mitigate the backside attacks, and finally (4) evaluates the proposed countermeasures against real attacks in silicon using commercial chips or fabricated prototypes with state-of-the-art optical setups.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

如今，随着封装和需求的进步，从汽车到军事和关键基础设施等不同应用中对现代集成电路（IC）特别是片上系统（SoC）的爆炸性需求使其安全性成为最受关注的问题。对于更小、更节能的设备，异构集成变得更有吸引力，但也使芯片更容易受到背面攻击，目前的对策与传统的 IC 和 SoC 设计不兼容。流动该项目的新颖之处在于（1）通过整体安全分类和定量评估方法评估现代集成电路针对“来自背面的非接触式光学攻击”的安全漏洞，以及（2）提供一个框架来制定针对电路、材料和封装级别的光学探测攻击的适当对策该项目的更广泛重要性在于从电子到材料科学的不同学科中，芯片设计人员和学生可以更好地理解数据之间的相关性。 IC 中的流量以及由此产生的物理签名，攻击者可利用这些签名通过新的教育材料和先进仪器提取敏感信息。该项目 (1) 调查现代 IC 的潜在安全漏洞，以应对背面光学攻击，并开发安全指标来识别这些漏洞。设备中的易受攻击的模块；(2) 开发基于低面积和低功耗电路的解决方案来检测和/或防止光学探测，(3) 开发基于材料和封装的对策来减轻背面攻击，最后 (4) 评估建议的使用商用芯片或具有最先进光学设置的制造原型来对抗真实的硅攻击。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Physical Assurance for Heterogeneous Integration: Challenges and Opportunities

异构集成的物理保障：挑战与机遇

• DOI: 10.1109/ipfa55383.2022.9915749
• 发表时间: 2022-07
• 期刊: IEEE International Symposium on the Physical and Failure Analysis of Integrated Circuits (IPFA
• 作者: Xi, Chengjie;Khan, Aslam A.;Jessurun, Nathan;Vashisthan, Nidish;Tehranipoor, Mark M.;Asadizanjani, Navid
• 通讯作者: Asadizanjani, Navid

Physical Inspection and Attacks on Electronics: An Academic Course for the Hardware Cybersecurity Workforce

电子设备的物理检查和攻击：硬件网络安全人员的学术课程

• DOI: 10.1109/msec.2023.3236999
• 发表时间: 2023-03
• 期刊: IEEE Security & Privacy
• 影响因子: 1.9
• 作者: True, John;Asadizanjani, Navid
• 通讯作者: Asadizanjani, Navid