Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Improving Decentralized Kernel Patch Ecosystems

协作研究：SaTC：CORE：小型：改善去中心化内核补丁生态系统

• 批准号: 2154989
• 负责人: Kangjie Lu
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-07-01 至 2025-06-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2154989&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; SaTC; CORE; Small

The objective of this project is to improve the security of open-source operating system (OS) kernels from the supply chain's perspective. As it is extremely costly to develop a brand new OS, a large number of downstream OS kernels are derived from an upstream OS kernel (e.g., Linux) to save development costs. However, this also means that the security of the downstream kernels are dependent on timely patch propagation from the upstream to downstream. The diversity and decentralized nature of downstreams causes delays or even missed upstream patches altogether. Even worse, due to customizations in the downstreams, it is time-consuming to infer which bugs are applicable to downstream and worth patching. Finally, even if they know an upstream vulnerability exists in a downstream and a patch is available, it may require additional efforts to port and test upstream patches --- a significant hurdle for many downstream vendors who are wary of breaking things.This project aims to develop a series of automated and novel analyses to reason about patches, bug behaviors, and their impacts. More specifically, the project will include an analysis of upstream patches and infer which ones fix critical bugs; it will automatically infer which downstreams are affected by an upstream bug and what security impact it bears; it will understand whether the corresponding upstream patch can be applied safely and correctly. The results of the project will alleviate the human burden in analyzing, reviewing, and adopting patches. Ultimately, they will improve the security of the entire open-source OS ecosystem.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目的目的是从供应链的角度提高开源操作系统（OS）内核的安全性。由于开发全新的操作系统非常昂贵，因此大量下游OS内核来自上游OS内核（例如Linux），以节省开发成本。但是，这也意味着下游内核的安全性取决于从上游到下游的及时贴片传播。下游的多样性和分散的性质会导致延误甚至完全错过上游补丁。更糟糕的是，由于下游的自定义，可以推断哪些错误适用于下游且值得修补，这很耗时。最后，即使他们知道上游的脆弱性存在于下游和补丁中，也可能需要额外的努力来端口和测试上游补丁 - 对于许多对破坏事物保持警惕的下游供应商来说，这是一个很大的障碍。此项目旨在开发一系列自动化和新颖的分析，以推理一系列的分析，以理解补丁，漏洞的行为和效果。更具体地说，该项目将包括对上游补丁的分析，并推断哪些修复了关键错误；它将自动推断出哪些下游会受到上游错误的影响以及其对安全性影响的影响；它将了解是否可以安全，正确地应用相应的上游补丁。该项目的结果将减轻人类在分析，审查和采用补丁方面的负担。最终，他们将提高整个开源OS生态系统的安全性。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并使用基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响审查标准，被认为值得通过评估来获得支持。

项目成果

ACTOR: Action-Guided Kernel Fuzzing

• 发表时间: 2023
• 作者: Marius Fleischer;Dipanjan Das;Priyanka Bose;Weiheng Bai;Kangjie Lu;Mathias Payer;Christopher Kruegel;Giovanni Vigna

Practical Program Modularization with Type-Based Dependence Analysis

• DOI: 10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179412
• 发表时间: 2023-05
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
• 作者: Kangjie Lu