Collaborative Research: Information and Markets

合作研究：信息与市场

• 批准号: 2049744
• 负责人: Stephen Morris
• 金额: $ 24.57万
• 依托单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2049744&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Information; Markets

This project analyzes the impact of information for the structure of markets. The use of information in internet and other markets has been revolutionized in the twenty by developments in technology. Economic institutions are adapting to these changes. At the same time, there have been fundamental improvements in our theoretical understanding of the role of information in the economy, but these new insights are somewhat abstract. Our project brings recent theoretical developments in information economics to bear on key economic questions in the economy. One component of our project addresses the new multi-billion dollar market for internet advertising. Advertisers purchase the right to display advertisements to particular internet users (the display of one advertisement to a particular internet user is known as an "impression". Because internet platforms have detailed information about users, it is possible to target users precisely, i.e., show particular advertisements to internet users with particular characteristics. The market for impressions has become very sophisticated. The research team seeks to understand the gains and losses associated with targeting impressions. This work will be an input into the important policy question of how internet platforms should be regulated. The team's work on the market for impressions will analyze new questions in auction theory. In particular, in the market for impressions, the publisher can use his private information about users to control advertisers' information about the value of particular viewers. Providing more information will increase the efficiency of the allocation. But more information will also reduce competition and give more information rents to the buyer. The team plans to understand the optimal information structure for the publishers and see how the optimal policy translates into selling methods used in practice. A second component of the project will study "Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets". Price discrimination when firms exploit information about consumers to target them with different prices. Price discrimination has been most successfully studied in the context of a monopoly seller. When firms both compete with each other but also price discriminate, the analysis can become intractable. This is a good example of a setting where more insight and tractability can be gained by allowing richer information. The team plans to provide tight bounds on welfare outcomes and price distributions for a given distribution of heterogeneous values of consumers. Finally, they want to improve our understanding of the relation between information and "higher-order beliefs". Higher-order beliefs encode a population's beliefs about the world, their beliefs about others' beliefs and so on. What is the relation between representing information via higher-order beliefs and less structured representations? They will develop the connection, understanding how a many player formalization of "more information" translates into higher-order beliefs and identifying settings where higher-order beliefs can be used to approximate any information structure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目分析了信息对市场结构的影响。二十世纪二十年代，由于技术的发展，互联网和其他市场中信息的使用发生了革命性的变化。 经济机构正在适应这些变化。与此同时，我们对信息在经济中的作用的理论理解也有了根本性的进步，但这些新的见解有些抽象。我们的项目带来了信息经济学的最新理论发展，以解决经济中的关键经济问题。我们项目的一个组成部分是针对价值数十亿美元的新互联网广告市场。广告商购买向特定互联网用户展示广告的权利（向特定互联网用户展示一个广告被称为“印象”。由于互联网平台拥有用户的详细信息，因此可以精确定位用户，即展示向具有特定特征的互联网用户投放特定广告。研究团队致力于了解与定位印象相关的收益和损失。受监管的。团队在印象市场上的工作将分析拍卖理论中的新问题，特别是在印象市场中，发布者可以使用其有关用户的私人信息来控制广告商有关特定观看者的价值的信息。但更多的信息也会减少竞争，并为买家带来更多的信息租金。该团队计划了解出版商的最佳信息结构，并了解最佳政策如何转化为实践中使用的销售方法。该项目的第二个组成部分将研究“竞争市场中的价格歧视”。价格歧视是指企业利用有关消费者的信息向他们提供不同的价格。 价格歧视在垄断卖方的背景下得到了最成功的研究。当企业既相互竞争又存在价格歧视时，分析就会变得棘手。这是一个很好的例子，说明通过允许更丰富的信息可以获得更多的洞察力和易处理性。该团队计划为给定的消费者异质价值分布提供福利结果和价格分布的严格界限。 最后，他们希望提高我们对信息与“高阶信念”之间关系的理解。高阶信念编码了人们对世界的信念、他们对他人信念的信念等等。通过高阶信念表示信息与结构化程度较低的表示之间有什么关系？ 他们将发展这种联系，了解许多参与者如何将“更多信息”形式化转化为高阶信念，并识别可以使用高阶信念来近似任何信息结构的环境。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并被视为值得通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估来支持。

项目成果

Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions

经典拍卖中的最优信息披露

• DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: American Economic Review: Insights
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Heumann, Tibor;Morris, Stephen;Sorokin, Constantine;Winter, Eyal
• 通讯作者: Winter, Eyal