CPS: Small: Data-driven Real-time Data Authentication in Wide-Area Energy Infrastructure Sensor Networks

CPS：小型：广域能源基础设施传感器网络中数据驱动的实时数据身份验证

• 批准号: 1931975
• 负责人: Yilu Liu
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: University of Tennessee Knoxville
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-09-15 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1931975&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CPS; Small; Data; driven; Real

The electric power grid is a large-scale dynamic cyber-physical systems (CPS) and it is critical to the modern society. To ensure its reliable operation, wide-area monitoring and control systems are essential to provide real-time understanding of the system dynamics such that proper control actions can be taken in real time to respond to power system disturbances and avoid blackouts. Like many other CPSs, power grids are vulnerable to data spoofing attacks due to the lack of security properties in monitoring and control protocols. Conventional cryptography techniques are not usable because the computation burden and time delay are intolerable to numerous power system devices considering the fast-changing system dynamics. This project proposes to develop spatial and temporal signature-based methods and tools that efficiently authenticate power grid wide-area measurements and effectively prevent malicious cyber-attacks from causing catastrophic losses. By delivering data authentication tools to detect cyber-attacks, this project will provide a new path that leverages measurement data from CPS itself to protect the security of wide-area highly-dynamic closed-loop real-time CPS. This project will have immediate positive impacts on electric power grid security and will also be beneficial to other tightly-coupled, physically-distributed CPSs. The project will also provide many educational resources and opportunities for K-12 and STEM students to broaden their participation in engineering.The project's primary goal is to address power system cyber security issues and help protect the power system from data spoofing attacks that are hard to detect by existing technologies. The project team discovered that power grid wide-area monitoring system (WAMS) measurement data have spatial and temporal signatures caused by natural responses of each local grid's continuous and random condition changes. These signatures are almost impossible to counterfeit, making them perfect for data authentication. This project will be the first time to use signatures in high data rate (up to 1,500 sample per second) measurements to develop data-driven cyber-physical security tools. Major steps to achieve the project goal include: (1) investigate methods to extract spatial and temporal signatures embedded in WAMS measurements efficiently; (2) develop methods and tools for authenticating a large volume of WAMS measurement data in real time; and (3) online implement and demonstrate cyber-attack detection technologies on FNET/GridEye, which is an actual cyber-physical system. With credible real-time information provided by the secure cyber system, power system operators will be able to assess system risks or take prompt actions to control and mitigate risks and prevent blackouts. The secured cyber system will also ensure the physical power system is under appropriate controls determined by automatic controllers to prevent systems entering dangerous status.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

电网是一个大规模的动态信息物理系统（CPS），对现代社会至关重要。为了确保其可靠运行，广域监测和控制系统对于实时了解系统动态至关重要，以便可以实时采取适当的控制措施来响应电力系统扰动并避免停电。与许多其他 CPS 一样，由于监控和控制协议缺乏安全特性，电网很容易受到数据欺骗攻击。传统的密码技术不可用，因为考虑到快速变化的系统动态，计算负担和时间延迟对于许多电力系统设备来说是无法忍受的。该项目建议开发基于空间和时间签名的方法和工具，以有效验证电网广域测量，并有效防止恶意网络攻击造成灾难性损失。通过提供数据身份验证工具来检测网络攻击，该项目将提供一条利用 CPS 本身测量数据来保护广域高动态闭环实时 CPS 安全的新途径。该项目将对电网安全产生立竿见影的积极影响，也将有利于其他紧耦合、物理分布式的CPS。该项目还将为 K-12 和 STEM 学生提供许多教育资源和机会，以扩大他们对工程的参与。该项目的主要目标是解决电力系统网络安全问题，并帮助保护电力系统免受难以察觉的数据欺骗攻击。通过现有技术进行检测。项目团队发现，电网广域监测系统（WAMS）测量数据具有由每个局部电网连续和随机条件变化的自然响应引起的空间和时间特征。这些签名几乎不可能被伪造，因此非常适合数据身份验证。该项目将首次在高数据速率（每秒高达 1,500 个样本）测量中使用签名来开发数据驱动的网络物理安全工具。实现项目目标的主要步骤包括：（1）研究有效提取嵌入 WAMS 测量中的空间和时间特征的方法； （2）开发实时验证大量WAMS测量数据的方法和工具； (3)在实际的网络物理系统FNET/GridEye上在线实施和演示网络攻击检测技术。利用安全网络系统提供的可靠实时信息，电力系统运营商将能够评估系统风险或立即采取行动来控制和减轻风险并防止停电。安全的网络系统还将确保物理电力系统处于自动控制器确定的适当控制之下，以防止系统进入危险状态。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查进行评估，被认为值得支持标准。

项目成果

Data source authentication of synchrophasor measurement devices based on 1D-CNN and GRU

基于1D-CNN和GRU的同步相量测量装置数据源认证

• DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2021.107207
• 发表时间: 2021-07-01
• 期刊: Electric Power Systems Research
• 影响因子: 3.9
• 作者: Shengyuan Liu;Shutang You;Chujie Zeng;H. Yin;Zhenzhi Lin;Yuqing Dong;W. Qiu;Wenxuan Yao;Yilu Liu
• 通讯作者: Yilu Liu

Data-Driven Event Identification in the U.S. Power Systems Based on 2D-OLPP and RUSBoosted Trees

基于 2D-OLPP 和 RUSBoosted 树的美国电力系统数据驱动事件识别

• DOI: 10.1109/tpwrs.2021.3092037
• 发表时间: 2021-06-24
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
• 影响因子: 6.6
• 作者: Shengyuan Liu;Shutang You;Zhenzhi Lin;Chujie Zeng;Hongyu Li;Weikang Wang;Xuetao Hu;Yilu Liu
• 通讯作者: Yilu Liu

Model-free Data Authentication for Cyber Security in Power Systems

电力系统网络安全的无模型数据认证

• DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2020.2986704
• 发表时间: 2020-04
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
• 影响因子: 9.6
• 作者: Liu, Shengyuan;You, Shutang;Yin, He;Lin, Zhenzhi;Liu, Yilu;Yao, Wenxuan;Sundaresh, Lakshmi
• 通讯作者: Sundaresh, Lakshmi

Time-frequency based cyber security defense of wide-area control system for fast frequency reserve

基于时频的快速频率储备广域控制系统网络安全防御

• DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107151
• 发表时间: 2021-11-01
• 期刊: International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems
• 影响因子: 5.2
• 作者: W. Qiu;Kaiqi Sun;Wenxuan Yao;Shutang You;H. Yin;Xiaoyang Ma;Yilu Liu
• 通讯作者: Yilu Liu

Practical Event Location Estimation Algorithm for Power Transmission System Based on Triangulation and Oscillation Intensity

基于三角测量和振荡强度的输电系统实用事件位置估计算法

• DOI: 10.1109/tpwrd.2022.3173974
• 发表时间: 2022-12-01
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery
• 影响因子: 4.4
• 作者: Shengyuan Liu;Kaiqi Sun;Chujie Zeng;Shutang You;Hongyu Li;Wenpeng Yu;Xi;a Deng;a;Zhenzhi Lin;Yilu Liu
• 通讯作者: Yilu Liu