CRII: SaTC: Mitigating Software-Based Microarchitectural Attacks via Secure Microcode Customization

CRII：SaTC：通过安全微代码定制缓解基于软件的微架构攻击

基本信息

批准号：
1850436
负责人：
Ashish Venkat
金额：
$ 17.5万
依托单位：
University of Virginia Main Campus
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2019
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2019-03-01 至 2022-02-28
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1850436&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
CRII SaTC Mitigating Software Based

项目摘要

Modern high-performance processors implement complex microarchitectural optimizations involving speculative execution which has recently been shown to be vulnerable to a type of malicious attack called Spectre. This project will investigate a microarchitectural solution framework to secure against such attacks. This framework, called context-sensitive fencing, will seek to automatically track and detect malicious execution patterns dynamically to trigger defense code without programmer intervention and with minimal impact on processor performance.This research will investigate a high performance defense strategy with three novel components: (a) secure microcode customization which leverages the processor's microcode engine to enable the surgical injection of Spectre defense code (e.g., speculation fences) into the dynamic instruction stream without the need for software patching, (b) a decoder-level information flow tracking framework which detects spurious execution patterns that result in the mis-training of core microprocessor structures such as the branch predictor, and (c) microarchitecture hardening mechanisms that shield sensitive microarchitectural structures against the malicious side effects of speculative execution, to further enable a security-aware processor architecture design.The reconfigurable microcode-level defense proposed by this research may address the Spectre attack which affects millions of users. This project will train and mentor graduate and undergraduate students and is expected to facilitate development of a hardware security course to be delivered in-class and online.The results from this research will be disseminated in the form of publications, presentations, design reports, course materials, and source code, and will be hosted publicly for the length of this project and beyond, on the investigator's website at http://www.cs.virginia.edu/venkat.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

现代高性能处理器实现了涉及推测执行的复杂微架构优化，最近已证明推测执行容易受到一种称为 Spectre 的恶意攻击。该项目将研究微架构解决方案框架以防止此类攻击。该框架称为上下文敏感防护，将寻求动态自动跟踪和检测恶意执行模式，以触发防御代码，无需程序员干预，并且对处理器性能的影响最小。这项研究将研究具有三个新颖组件的高性能防御策略：（ a) 安全微代码定制，利用处理器的微代码引擎将 Spectre 防御代码（例如推测栅栏）注入到动态指令流中，而无需软件修补；(b) 解码器级信息流跟踪框架，检测杂散导致核心微处理器结构（例如分支预测器）训练错误的执行模式，以及（c）微架构强化机制，保护敏感微架构结构免受推测执行的恶意副作用的影响，以进一步实现安全感知的处理器架构设计本研究提出的可重构微码级防御可能会解决影响数百万用户的Spectre攻击。该项目将培训和指导研究生和本科生，并预计将促进硬件安全课程的开发，该课程将在课堂和在线授课。这项研究的结果将以出版物、演示文稿、设计报告、课程的形式传播材料和源代码，并将在本项目期间及之后公开托管在研究者的网站上：http://www.cs.virginia.edu/venkat。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并被认为是值得的通过评估提供支持利用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准。

项目成果

期刊论文数量（4）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Mitigating Speculative Execution Attacks via Context-Sensitive Fencing

通过上下文敏感防护减轻推测执行攻击

DOI：
10.1109/mdat.2022.3152633
发表时间：
2022-02
期刊：
IEEE Design & Test
影响因子：
2
作者：
Taram, Mohammadkazem;Venkat, Ashish;Tullsen, Dean
通讯作者：
Tullsen, Dean

I See Dead µops: Leaking Secrets via Intel/AMD Micro-Op Caches

我看到死微操作：通过 Intel/AMD 微操作缓存泄露秘密

DOI：
10.1109/isca52012.2021.00036
发表时间：
2021-06
期刊：
2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA
影响因子：
0
作者：
Ren, Xida;Moody, Logan;Taram, Mohammadkazem;Jordan, Matthew;Tullsen, Dean M.;Venkat, Ashish
通讯作者：
Venkat, Ashish

Context-Sensitive Decoding: On-Demand Microcode Customization for Security and Energy Management

上下文相关解码：用于安全和能源管理的按需微代码定制