SaTC: CORE: Small: Collaborative: Oblivious ISAs for Secure and Efficient Enclave Programming

SaTC：核心：小型：协作：用于安全高效 Enclave 编程的不经意的 ISA

• 批准号: 1816226
• 负责人: Christopher Fletcher
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-15 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1816226&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Collaborative; Oblivious

Computing on personal data is critical for both personal and social good. For example, we write programs that predict early onset medical conditions and detect the spread of diseases before they become epidemics. However, such computing is fraught with privacy concerns because programs, and the hardware they run on, create a trail of clues that an attacker can observe to reconstruct personal data without ever seeing the data directly. This project will create computer systems that proactively leave no clues, i.e., no side-effects that can leak personal secrets.The technical approach is to introduce a new Oblivious Instruction Set Architecture (OISA) for side-channel secure execution. The key idea in OISAs is to decouple the programming model from the concrete techniques that prevent information leaks. The first project thrust will investigate a range of Oblivious instructions---from simple oblivious instructions like an oblivious conditional move or oblivious load to more complex instructions like oblivious sort or floating point operations---to improve performance. The second project thrust will investigate how each of these instructions can be ported across threat models, e.g., digital and power side channels.By decoupling threat model from programming model, OISAs will unlock innovation on both software and hardware fronts. Programmers can focus on identifying secret variables that are intrinsic to applications, while abstracting out micro-architecture and threat model details. Hardware architects can focus on how to efficiently protect those secrets, and how to patch existing implementations when new threats emerge. To support this philosophy, the project will train a new class of students and researchers who can work across circuits, micro-architecture, compilers and applied cryptography to build secure systems and, in the future, apply the lessons learned to other high-impact problems that require cross-layer solutions.The OISA project will store all publications, code, and data-sets on public-facing websites, hosted at both University of Texas and Illinois for at least 3 years after the end of the project. This information will be made available via commercial websites. Links to these websites will be mirrored at http://spark.ece.utexas.edu/oisa and http://cwfletcher.net/oisa.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

个人数据计算对于个人和社会利益都至关重要。例如，我们编写的程序可以预测早期发病的医疗状况并在疾病成为流行病之前检测到疾病的传播。然而，这种计算充满了隐私问题，因为程序及其运行的硬件会创建一系列线索，攻击者可以通过观察来重建个人数据，而无需直接查看数据。该项目将创建主动不留下任何线索的计算机系统，即不会产生可能泄露个人秘密的副作用。技术方法是引入一种新的不经意指令集架构（OISA）用于侧通道安全执行。 OISA 的关键思想是将编程模型与防止信息泄漏的具体技术分离。第一个项目主旨将研究一系列不经意指令——从简单的不经意指令（如不经意条件移动或不经意加载）到更复杂的指令（如不经意排序或浮点运算）——以提高性能。第二个项目主旨将研究如何跨威胁模型（例如数字和电源侧通道）移植这些指令。通过将威胁模型与编程模型解耦，OISA 将释放软件和硬件方面的创新。程序员可以专注于识别应用程序固有的秘密变量，同时抽象出微架构和威胁模型细节。硬件架构师可以专注于如何有效地保护这些秘密，以及如何在出现新威胁时修补现有的实现。为了支持这一理念，该项目将培训一批新的学生和研究人员，他们可以跨电路、微架构、编译器和应用密码学工作来构建安全系统，并在未来将学到的经验教训应用于其他高影响力的问题需要跨层解决方案。OISA 项目将在项目结束后将所有出版物、代码和数据集存储在德克萨斯大学和伊利诺伊大学托管的面向公众的网站上至少 3 年。该信息将通过商业网站提供。这些网站的链接将反映在 http://spark.ece.utexas.edu/oisa 和 http://cwfletcher.net/oisa。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的评估进行评估，被认为值得支持。智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准。

项目成果

Data Oblivious ISA Extensions for Side Channel-Resistant and High Performance Computing

用于抗侧通道和高性能计算的数据忽略 ISA 扩展

• DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23061
• 发表时间: 2024-09-13
• 期刊: IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
• 作者: Jiyong Yu;Lucas Hsiung;Mohamad El Hajj;Christopher W. Fletcher
• 通讯作者: Christopher W. Fletcher

Speculative Taint Tracking (STT): A Comprehensive Protection for Speculatively Accessed Data

推测性污点跟踪 (STT)：对推测性访问数据的全面保护

• DOI: 10.1145/3352460.3358274
• 发表时间: 2019-10-12
• 期刊: IEEE Micro
• 影响因子: 3.6
• 作者: Jiyong Yu;Mengjia Yan;Artem Khyzha;Adam Morrison;J. Torrellas;Christopher W. Fletcher
• 通讯作者: Christopher W. Fletcher

Speculative Data-Oblivious Execution (SDO): Mobilizing Safe Prediction For Safe and Efficient Speculative Execution

推测性数据不经意执行 (SDO)：利用安全预测实现安全高效的推测执行

• 发表时间: 2020-06
• 期刊: International Conference on Computer Architecture
• 作者: Jiyong Yu; Namrata Mantri
• 通讯作者: Namrata Mantri