Integrated Framework for Detection and Mitigation of GPS Spoofing Attacks in Smart Grids

智能电网中 GPS 欺骗攻击检测和缓解的集成框架

• 批准号: 1719043
• 负责人: Nikolaos Gatsis
• 金额: $ 39.99万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at San Antonio
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-08-01 至 2022-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1719043&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Integrated; Framework; Detection; Mitigation; GPS

The Global Positioning System is one of the nation's most critical infrastructures, which provides precise timing and location to a host of systems and applications. Examples include air, sea, and land transportation, telecommunications, financial transactions, real-time industrial control systems, and most importantly, the electrical power grid. Specifically, reliable operation of the future electrical power grids depends on the availability of grid measurements with precise timing that is enabled by the Global Positioning System's time-synchronization technology. Although this system is very reliable, it is vulnerable to malicious spoofing cyber-attacks that disrupt the time synchronization of measurements. This consequently misleads the seamless operation of the infrastructures relying on it. For example, these attacks have ramifications on the electrical power grid, including power outages with dire socio-economic implications. The theme of this project is the real-time detection and mitigation of such attacks on the Global Positioning System with applications in power grids. Spoofing attacks manifest themselves at different physical layers including the signals aggregated by the Global Positioning System receiver, the time and location computed by the receiver, and eventually the voltage and current phasor measurements collected from Phasor Measurement Units in the electrical grid. Novel, rigorous, and comprehensive models of the spoofing effects on the Global Positioning System receiver as well as the power grid operation are put forth. Leveraging the novel models, this research additionally furnishes advanced methods to detect the attacks and ultimately protect the grid from their harmful effects. Specifically, online spoofing detection schemes are developed using sparsity-based optimization formulations. These schemes are able to detect and isolate unnatural changes in the received satellite signals and the associated time and location solutions. Based on a novel measurement model that directly relates the spoofing attack with the electrical network state, dynamic algorithms are developed to maintain an accurate state estimate of the power grid, while seamlessly restoring grid stability in the presence of attacks.

全球定位系统是国家最重要的基础设施之一，为许多系统和应用程序提供精确的定时和位置。例子包括空中、海上和陆地运输、电信、金融交易、实时工业控制系统，以及最重要的电网。具体而言，未来电网的可靠运行取决于全球定位系统时间同步技术实现的精确定时电网测量的可用性。尽管该系统非常可靠，但它很容易受到恶意欺骗网络攻击，从而破坏测量的时间同步。因此，这会误导依赖它的基础设施的无缝运行。例如，这些攻击会对电网产生影响，包括造成可怕的社会经济影响的停电。该项目的主题是实时检测和缓解针对全球定位系统的此类攻击及其在电网中的应用。欺骗攻击表现在不同的物理层，包括全球定位系统接收器聚合的信号、接收器计算的时间和位置，以及最终从电网中的相量测量单元收集的电压和电流相量测量值。 提出了针对全球定位系统接收器和电网运行的欺骗效应的新颖、严格和全面的模型。利用新颖的模型，这项研究还提供了先进的方法来检测攻击并最终保护电网免受其有害影响。具体来说，在线欺骗检测方案是使用基于稀疏性的优化公式开发的。这些方案能够检测和隔离接收到的卫星信号以及相关时间和位置解决方案中的非自然变化。基于一种直接将欺骗攻击与电网状态联系起来的新颖测量模型，开发了动态算法来维持电网的准确状态估计，同时在出现攻击时无缝恢复电网稳定性。

项目成果

Real-Time Rejection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System

• DOI: 10.1109/tie.2017.2787581
• 发表时间: 2018-08-01
• 期刊: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
• 影响因子: 7.7
• 作者: Khalajmehrabadi, Ali;Gatsis, Nikolaos;Taha, Ahmad F.
• 通讯作者: Taha, Ahmad F.

Rejection of Smooth GPS Time Synchronization Attacks via Sparse Techniques

• DOI: 10.1109/jsen.2020.3014239
• 发表时间: 2021-01-01
• 期刊: IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL
• 影响因子: 4.3
• 作者: Schmidt, Erick;Lee, Junhwan;Akopian, David
• 通讯作者: Akopian, David

Evaluation of the detection and mitigation of time synchronization attacks on the global positioning system

全球定位系统时间同步攻击的检测和缓解评估

• DOI: 10.1109/plans.2018.8373528
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS
• 作者: Khalajmehrabadi, Ali;Gatsis, Nikolaos;Akopian, David
• 通讯作者: Akopian, David

Software-Defined Radio GNSS Instrumentation for Spoofing Mitigation: A Review and a Case Study

• DOI: 10.1109/tim.2018.2869261
• 发表时间: 2019-08-01
• 期刊: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INSTRUMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT
• 影响因子: 5.6
• 作者: Schmidt, Erick;Ruble, Zachary;Pack, Daniel J.
• 通讯作者: Pack, Daniel J.

Anti-Spoofing Technique Against GPS Time and Position Attacks Based on Sparse Signal Processing

基于稀疏信号处理的GPS时间和位置攻击反欺骗技术

• DOI: 10.33012/2021.17988
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: The International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation
• 作者: Lee, Junhwan;Schmidt, Erick;Gatsis, Nikolaos;Akopian, David
• 通讯作者: Akopian, David