STARSS: Small: SecureDust -- The Physical Limits of Information Security

STARSS：小：SecureDust——信息安全的物理极限

• 批准号: 1619558
• 负责人: Daniel Holcomb
• 金额: $ 30.81万
• 依托单位: University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-09-01 至 2020-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1619558&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; SecureDust; Physical; Limits

Truly ubiquitous computing with very small, self-powered and wirelessly networked integrated circuits will become possible within a decade. Applications of these devices include biosensors, environmental monitors, and defense, all of which bring a need for security and privacy. Enabling the use of strong cryptographic algorithms on extremely constrained devices requires rethinking, from an energy-first perspective, the design and implementation of basic cryptographic building blocks. The Secure Dust project seeks to reduce the energy of cryptographic functions in advanced technologies by an order of magnitude, and to validate the designs using test chips. The findings of this project will help to secure future ubiquitous devices and the Internet of Things.The specific research objective of this project is to explore the scaling down of security functions into advanced CMOS technologies and in particular the important role of manufacturing variations and noise that can be both advantageous (Physical Unclonable Functions and Random Number Generation) and detrimental (side-channel resistant ciphers and hash functions) depending on the cryptography block. We target an energy budget of picojoules per secure transaction, built upon basic cryptography functions. The project combines design expertise in lightweight cryptography using block ciphers, hash functions, PUFs and RNGs, along with low-energy techniques and realistic semiconductor design flows and economic realities. FPGA-prototyping and CMOS FinFET test chips will be used to demonstrate complete cryptosystem functionality, including side-channel susceptibility.

真正无处不在的计算，具有很小，自动化和无线网络的集成电路将在十年内成为可能。这些设备的应用包括生物传感器，环境监视器和防御，所有这些都带来了安全和隐私的需求。从能源优先的角度来看，基本加密构件的设计和实施，实现在极度约束设备上使用强密码算法的使用需要重新思考。安全的灰尘项目旨在通过一个数量级来减少高级技术中加密功能的能量，并使用测试芯片验证设计。 The findings of this project will help to secure future ubiquitous devices and the Internet of Things.The specific research objective of this project is to explore the scaling down of security functions into advanced CMOS technologies and in particular the important role of manufacturing variations and noise that can be both advantageous (Physical Unclonable Functions and Random Number Generation) and detrimental (side-channel resistant ciphers and hash functions) depending on the cryptography block. 我们以基本的加密功能为基础，针对Picojoules的能源预算。 该项目结合了使用块密码，哈希功能，PUF和RNG的设计专业知识，以及低能技术和现实的半导体设计流和经济现实。 FPGA - 促型和CMOS FinFET测试芯片将用于展示完整的密码系统功能，包括侧通道敏感性。

项目成果

Efficient Register Renaming Architectures for 8-bit AES Datapath at 0.55 pJ/bit in 16-nm FinFET

16 nm FinFET 中 0.55 pJ/位的 8 位 AES 数据路径的高效寄存器重命名架构

• DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2020.2999593
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI
• 作者: Dhanuskodi, Siva Nishok;Allen, Samuel;Holcomb, Daniel E.
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel E.