STARSS: Small: Self-reliant Field-Programmable Gate Arrays

STARSS：小型：自力更生的现场可编程门阵列

• 批准号: 1526211
• 负责人: William Harris
• 金额: $ 23.71万
• 依托单位: Georgia Tech Research Corporation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-09-01 至 2017-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1526211&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; Self; reliant; Field

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are hardware circuits that can be reconfigured by a system user after being deployed. FPGAs are a compelling alternative architecture that may allow hardware performance to continue to improve at a dramatic rate. Unfortunately, systems that incorporate an FPGA may allow a potentially untrusted user to reprogram hardware after it has been deployed. Such a scenario enables novel security attacks that can leak a user's private information or corrupt critical information stored on a system, but are performed entirely in hardware. This project develops an approach for ensuring that FPGAs satisfy strong security policies even when programmed by an untrusted user that will incur no overheard for runtime performance. This research investigates techniques that automatically infer proofs of information-flow properties of circuits. This project designs and implements policy languages, proof languages, checking-circuit synthesizers, and proof generators, which in combination will dramatically improve the security of FPGA-based systems. These techniques will enable devices and data-centers to use FPGAs in novel circuit designs that satisfy strong, precise security guarantees and can be updated dynamically.

现场可编程门阵列 (FPGA) 是系统用户在部署后可以重新配置的硬件电路。 FPGA 是一种引人注目的替代架构，可以让硬件性能继续以惊人的速度提高。遗憾的是，采用 FPGA 的系统可能会允许潜在不受信任的用户在硬件部署后对其进行重新编程。这种情况使得新型安全攻击成为可能，这些攻击可能会泄露用户的私人信息或破坏系统上存储的关键信息，但完全是在硬件中执行的。该项目开发了一种方法，确保 FPGA 满足强大的安全策略，即使由不受信任的用户编程，也不会导致运行时性能被窃听。这项研究研究了自动推断电路信息流特性证明的技术。该项目设计并实现了策略语言、证明语言、检查电路合成器和证明生成器，它们的结合将显着提高基于 FPGA 的系统的安全性。这些技术将使设备和数据中心能够在新颖的电路设计中使用 FPGA，满足强大、精确的安全保证，并且可以动态更新。