Economically-Robust and Secure Auctions for Heterogeneous Secondary Spectrum Market

异构二级频谱市场经济稳健且安全的拍卖

• 批准号: 1407986
• 负责人: Xiuzhen Cheng
• 金额: $ 36万
• 依托单位: George Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-09-01 至 2018-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1407986&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economically; Robust; Secure; Auctions; Heterogeneous

Over the past few years a number of auction mechanisms have been proposed to improve the channel utilization and benefit both the primary and secondary users in a spectrum market. The major design objective of these auctions focuses on truthfulness (economic-robustness) to prevent market manipulation, i.e., to ensure that buyers and sellers cannot obtain more utility by cheating on bid prices. This objective is typically realized by adapting classic auctions, such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), McAfee, and Myerson's Optimal Mechanism (MOM), for spectrum reuse in homogeneous spectrum markets. There are unaddressed challenges with this approach in a heterogeneous spectrum market, which is characterized by bid diversity in both the spatial and temporal domains, i.e., buyers and sellers can bid different units of the spectrum bands with different channel properties at different locations and in different times. VCG, MOM, and McAfee all lose their truthfulness when bid diversity is considered for heterogeneous spectrum markets. This phenomenon has been largely overlooked by the current research. Additional challenges are that bidders and the auctioneer may have an incentive to collude for profit maximization, and that the disclosure of the bids to the auctioneer may reveal private information of the bidders, resulting in economic espionage and other security concerns. The recent research on secure auctions is sporadic, missing an in-depth study to address the unique challenges of secure auctions in heterogeneous spectrum markets. This project aims to address the challenges mentioned above. The proposed research may foster the development of novel techniques and methodologies toward secure, robust, and efficient spectrum access.The desired properties of an auction in a heterogeneous secondary spectrum market will incent buyers and sellers to use spectrum efficiently. These include: i) truthfulness, collusion-resistance, cheating prevention, and privacy preservation to encourage users to join the market and discourage them from predicting others' bids for market manipulation; ii) high revenues for sellers/buyers and the auctioneer to incent them to participate; and iii) high spectrum utilization. The objective of this project is to design economically-robust and secure auctions that transform current auction models to achieve these properties for heterogeneous secondary spectrum markets. The proposed research can be summarized by the following activities: the design of economically-robust auctions based on virtual valuations for fairness, efficiency, and optimality to prevent market manipulation when addressing the challenges brought on by bid diversity and spectrum reuse; the design of collusion-resistant auctions based on the concept of virtual bidders and novel pricing functions when bidder-bidder and bidder-auctioneer collusions exist; and the design of privacy-preserving auctions based on Homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, and secret-sharing, under the assumption that the auctioneer is not trust-worthy. The expected results of this project include novel auction mechanisms, algorithms, and theories. The research findings will be disseminated through high-quality publications, presentations in focused workshops, and conferences. The project outcomes will provide guidance to industry and may be adopted for market-based short-term spectrum allocations.

在过去几年中，已经提出了许多拍卖机制来提高信道利用率并使频谱市场中的主要和次要用户受益。这些拍卖的主要设计目标侧重于真实性（经济稳健性），以防止市场操纵，即确保买家和卖家不能通过欺骗投标价格来获得更多效用。这一目标通常通过采用经典拍卖来实现，例如 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)、McAfee 和 Myerson 最优机制 (MOM)，以便在同质频谱市场中实现频谱重用。 在异构频谱市场中，这种方法存在尚未解决的挑战，异构频谱市场的特点是在空间和时间域上都有出价多样性，即买方和卖方可以在不同地点和不同地点对具有不同信道属性的不同频段单元进行投标。次。当考虑异构频谱市场的出价多样性时，VCG、MOM 和 McAfee 都失去了真实性。目前的研究在很大程度上忽视了这一现象。其他挑战是投标人和拍卖师可能有勾结以实现利润最大化的动机，并且向拍卖师披露投标书可能会泄露投标人的私人信息，从而导致经济间谍活动和其他安全问题。最近关于安全拍卖的研究是零星的，缺乏深入的研究来解决异构频谱市场中安全拍卖的独特挑战。该项目旨在解决上述挑战。拟议的研究可能会促进新技术和方法的发展，以实现安全、稳健和高效的频谱访问。异构二级频谱市场中拍卖的理想特性将激励买家和卖家有效地使用频谱。其中包括：i）诚实、防串通、防止作弊和保护隐私，以鼓励用户加入市场，并阻止他们预测他人的出价以操纵市场； ii) 为卖家/买家和拍卖师带来高收入，以激励他们参与； iii) 高频谱利用率。 该项目的目标是设计经济稳健且安全的拍卖，改变当前的拍卖模式，以实现异构二级频谱市场的这些特性。拟议的研究可以概括为以下活动：基于虚拟估值设计经济稳健的拍卖，以实现公平、效率和最优，以在解决投标多样性和频谱复用带来的挑战时防止市场操纵；当存在投标人与投标人以及投标人与拍卖人共谋时，基于虚拟投标人和新颖的定价功能概念的抗共谋拍卖的设计；以及在拍卖师不可信的假设下，基于同态加密、安全多方计算和秘密共享的隐私保护拍卖的设计。该项目的预期成果包括新颖的拍卖机制、算法和理论。研究结果将通过高质量出版物、重点研讨会和会议上的演讲进行传播。项目成果将为行业提供指导，并可用于基于市场的短期频谱分配。