Collaborative Research: Delegated Decision Making in Value-Driven Systems Engineering

协作研究：价值驱动系统工程中的委托决策

基本信息

批准号：
1333454
负责人：
Daniel McAdams
金额：
$ 14.46万
依托单位：
Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2013
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2013-08-01 至 2017-05-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1333454&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Collaborative Research Delegated Decision Making

项目摘要

The research objective of this collaborative award is to delineate the benefits and limitations of value-driven decision authority delegation in large systems engineering projects as compared to the more traditional approach of delegating authority through a requirements flow-down process. A new and practical value-driven decision delegation approach will be defined based on the mathematical foundations of probability theory, decision theory, and game theory. Using rigorous mathematical analysis, the investigation will characterize this new approach and compare it to a requirements-driven approach. New methods will be derived (1) by which subsystem engineers can communicate their beliefs about technical capabilities to systems engineers and (2) by which systems engineers can incentivize subsystem engineers to seek designs that maximize system-level expected utility. The investigation will start by examining the case of a single subsystem and will culminate with the analysis of decision delegation in the general case of concurrent subsystem design.If successful, this research will have a significant impact on the development of large-scale complex engineered systems of interest to private industry, the government, and the public at large. An improved understanding of decision delegation will enable engineers to structure engineering projects in a more efficient and effective matter, resulting in better systems, at lower cost, and within less time. Furthermore, fundamental insights discovered in this research will provide direction to future computational and empirical studies. Finally, the discoveries made in this research will be incorporated into new systems engineering curricula, which will lead to a better-prepared next generation of systems engineers.

该协作奖项的研究目标是与大型系统工程项目中价值驱动的决策当局代表团的收益和局限性相比，与通过要求下降流程委派授权的方法相比。将根据概率理论，决策理论和游戏理论的数学基础来定义一种新的和实用的价值驱动决策授权委托委托方法。使用严格的数学分析，调查将表征这种新方法，并将其与需求驱动的方法进行比较。将得出新的方法（1），子系统工程师可以通过这些方法向系统工程师传达对技术能力的信念以及（2）系统工程师可以激励子系统工程师寻求最大化系统级预期实用程序的设计。调查将从检查单个子系统的情况开始，并将在一般的并发子系统设计中对决策委托的分析达到顶峰。如果成功，这项研究将对大型复杂工程感兴趣的大型复杂工程系统的发展产生重大影响，政府，政府和公众。对决策委托的深入了解将使工程师能够以更高效，更有效的物质进行工程项目，从而以较低的成本和更少的时间内获得更好的系统。此外，在这项研究中发现的基本见解将为未来的计算和经验研究提供方向。最后，这项研究中的发现将纳入新的系统工程课程中，这将导致准备好的下一代系统工程师。