Behavioral Mechanism Design

行为机制设计

• 批准号: 1125485
• 负责人: Jeffrey Ely
• 金额: $ 21.78万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-08-15 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1125485&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Behavioral; Mechanism; Design

This award funds research in economic theory that develops methods for incorporating behavioral ideas about individual preferences into formal mechanism design models.Mechanism design is a formal framework for analyzing the design and operation of social and economic institutions. It is a central tool in microeconomic theory applied in contexts as varied as organizational design, personnel management, auctions, matching markets etc. A cornerstone of mechanism design theory is the analysis of incentives and how institutions are designed to manage them. Behavioral economics has identified a number of important deviations from standard theories of individual behavior and researchers have begun to revisit mechanism design problems in their presence. A theoretical hurdle exists because many of these theories give rise to preferences under which the standard tools for characterizing the constraints imposed by incentives no longer apply. In this project the PI is investigating a generalization of the classical revenue equivalence property and accompanying analytical techniques. Applying these techniques allows the PI and future researchers to study how behavioral assumptions alter the normative and positive theories of institution design. An important behavioral finding is loss aversion. Losses relative to a reference level of consumption are amplified by comparison to gains. This is a finding that is documented at the level of individual behavior and the next step for research is to understand its impact on markets. In this project the PI reformulates a classical problem of monopoly price discrimination to investigate how a seller leverages a buyers' loss aversion in order to increase profits. The methodology developed here can also be applied to develop new insights into the design of auctions, insurance, and other contracts. Finally, a related behavioral phenomenon, inequality aversion, lends itself to a similar analysis. Conflict resolution, contract settlement, and other bargaining protocols can be analyzed from mechanism design standpoint when the affected agents have preferences that respond to inequality.

该奖项为经济理论的研究提供了资金，该研究开发了将有关个人偏好的行为思想纳入正式机制设计模型的方法。机械设计是分析社会和经济机构的设计和运作的正式框架。 它是微观经济理论中的一种核心工具，该工具应用于组织设计，人事管理，拍卖，匹配市场等各种各样的不同之处。行为经济学已经确定了与个体行为的标准理论的许多重要偏差，研究人员已经开始在存在的情况下重新审视机制。 存在理论上的障碍，因为这些理论中的许多理论都引起了偏好，根据这些偏好，可以表征不再适用激励措施所施加的约束的标准工具。 在该项目中，PI正在研究经典收入等效属性和随附的分析技术的概括。应用这些技术使PI和未来的研究人员能够研究行为假设如何改变机构设计的规范和积极理论。一个重要的行为发现是损失厌恶。 相对于参考消费水平的损失与收益相比会扩大。 这是一个在个人行为层面上记录的发现，下一步的研究是了解其对市场的影响。 在该项目中，PI重新制定了垄断价格歧视的经典问题，以调查卖方如何利用买方损失的厌恶来增加利润。 此处开发的方法也可以应用于开发有关拍卖，保险和其他合同设计的新见解。 最后，一种相关的行为现象，不平等厌恶，将自己赋予了类似的分析。 当受影响的代理具有响应不平等的偏好时，可以从机制设计的角度分析冲突解决，合同解决和其他议价方案。