Reconciling Post-Election Auditing with the Secret Ballot

协调选举后审计与无记名投票

• 批准号: 1049730
• 负责人: Edward Felten
• 金额: $ 17万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1049730&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Reconciling; Post; Election; Auditing; Secret; Reconciling; Post; Election; Auditing; Secret

A fundamental tension exists between transparency and privacy in electronic voting. Electoral transparency requires access to primary voter records, so observers can be sure that the election was run appropriately. Ballot privacy---keeping ballot contents separate from information that can identify the voter---is required to prevent coercion and vote-selling. If we discard either transparency or privacy, voting becomes much simpler: without transparency, ballots can be perfectly private; with no privacy requirement, elections can be perfectly transparent. The project aims to reconcile transparency with ballot privacy in electronic voting systems.The project has several goals. The project is identifying legal and technical barriers to increased privacy, both in terms of fundamental limits and limits imposed by technology. The project is also identifying vulnerabilities enabled by the movement for increased electoral transparency, for example the practical risks of identifying ballots using voter marks and paper-fingerprinting. This enables research to design privacy-preserving methods for publishing artifacts of transparency, such as scanned ballot images. The project is examining the loss of ballot privacy intrinsic to various models of post-election audits, where the trend has been toward greater disclosure of records, which may implicate issues of ballot privacy. The project is creating process models of post-election audits to identify and compare ballot privacy leakage and developing methods to better determine how many ballots are truly in an audit batch, a crucial but overlooked element of the mathematics in post-election audits.

电子投票中的透明度和隐私之间存在根本的张力。 选举透明度需要访问主要选民记录，因此观察者可以确保选举是适当的。 投票隐私---将投票内容与可以识别选民的信息分开，以防止胁迫和投票。 如果我们放弃透明度或隐私性，则投票变得更加简单：没有透明度，选票就可以是完全私人的；在没有隐私要求的情况下，选举可以完全透明。 该项目旨在将透明度与电子投票系统中的投票隐私相结合。该项目有多个目标。该项目是根据技术施加的基本限制和限制，确定了增加隐私的法律和技术障碍。 该项目还确定了由于提高选举透明度的运动所带来的漏洞，例如，使用选民标记和纸质刻板识别投票的实际风险。 这使得研究能够设计保存隐私的方法，以发布透明度的文物，例如扫描的投票图像。 该项目正在研究各种选举后审计模型的投票隐私丢失，在这些模型中，趋势已旨在更大的记录披露，这可能暗示了投票隐私的问题。 该项目正在创建选举后审计的过程模型，以识别和比较投票隐私泄漏和开发方法，以更好地确定审计批次中真正有多少选票，这是选举后审计中数学的至关重要但被忽略的元素。