Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Policy Tool Bundling: Predicting the Selection of Economic Development Policy Instruments Using a Multivariate Probit Analysis

政治学博士论文研究：政策工具捆绑：使用多元概率分析预测经济发展政策工具的选择

• 批准号: 0921538
• 负责人: Richard Feiock
• 金额: $ 1.05万
• 依托单位: Florida State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-01 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0921538&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science; Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).Modeling choices of economic development incentive tools requires integration of a complex system of political and economic considerations and accounting for relationships among specific instruments within a bundle of policy options. Previous studies of policy instrument choice focus almost exclusively on individual policy tools in isolation. This neglects the reality that multiple tools work in conjunction with one another. Relationships among economic development incentives can result from local officials' pursuit of efficiencies, such as scale economies, or their pursuit of political gains, from satisfying ideological or constituency demands. The selection of any policy alternative is not independent of the other policy options. Just as with economic goods, policy tools can operate as complements or substitutes. This dissertation develops a theory of policy tool bundling to explain the configurations of development policies cities adopt to promote their economic or political interests. The policy bundling approach builds on extant research from the tools of government and policy diffusion literatures by investigating how factors internal to local governments and external pressures from neighboring jurisdictions influence the set of policy instruments selected. Pooled, longitudinal data is employed to identify codependences among incentives policies for Georgia cities. The longitudinal nature of the study allows predictions of the influence of previous and current economic policies choices while avoiding spurious relationships. Focusing on one state facilitates the inclusion of diffusion variables capturing the actions of surrounding communities. The influences of political institutions, particularly the presence of professional managers and at-large council representation are expected to encourage policy bundling based on efficiency concerns. The presence of elected executives and district representation are expected to encourage bundling based on political interests. A Bayesian multivariate probit model is used to predict economic policy choice because it allows simultaneous estimation of multiple policy adoptions and identification substitutive and complementary effects. The intellectual merit of this dissertation is derived from the synthesizing of the policy tools and diffusion policy theoretical frameworks to explain policy bundling. Systematic investigation of policy interdependencies is absent from extant empirical research in both areas. The theory of policy bundling developed in this research seeks to fill this lacuna and can be extended to numerous policy areas including economic development, environmental regulation, tax policy, and numerous other government initiatives which utilize multiple instruments simultaneously. Thus, this research promises to benefit both academics and practitioners and expand our understanding of how political institutions influence policy outcomes.

该奖项是根据2009年《美国复苏与再投资法》（公法111-5）资助的。进行经济发展激励工具的模型选择，需要整合一个复杂的政治和经济考虑体系，并考虑一系列政策选择中的特定工具之间的关系。对政策工具选择的先前研究几乎只关注孤立的单个政策工具。这忽略了一个现实，即多种工具相互结合。 经济发展激励措施之间的关系可能是由于当地官员对规模经济的效率或他们对政治收益的追求，这是由于令人满意的意识形态或选区的要求而造成的。 选择任何政策替代方案都不独立于其他政策选择。 与经济产品一样，政策工具也可以作为补充或替代品运行。 该论文开发了一种政策工具的理论，以解释城市为促进其经济或政治利益而采用的发展政策的配置。 政策捆绑方法是基于政府和政策扩散文献工具的现有研究，通过研究如何内部对地方政府的因素以及邻近司法管辖区的外部压力影响所选政策工具的集合。汇总的纵向数据用于确定佐治亚城市的激励政策之间的相互依赖。该研究的纵向性质允许预测以前和当前的经济政策选择的影响，同时避免了虚假的关系。专注于一个国家有助于捕捉周围社区的行动的扩散变量。 政治机构，特别是专业经理和一般理事会代表的存在的影响，有望鼓励基于效率关注的政策捆绑。 预计民选高管和地区代表的存在将鼓励基于政治利益捆绑。 贝叶斯多元概率模型用于预测经济政策选择，因为它允许同时估算多种政策采用以及识别替代和互补效应。 本论文的智力优点源自策略工具的综合和扩散政策理论框架，以解释策略捆绑。 在两个领域现有的经验研究中，没有对政策相互依存的系统研究。 这项研究中发展的政策捆绑理论旨在填补这一空白，并可以扩展到许多政策领域，包括经济发展，环境监管，税收政策以及同时利用多种工具的许多其他政府倡议。 因此，这项研究有望使学者和从业者受益，并扩展我们对政治制度如何影响政策成果的理解。