NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Experimental Analysis of Alternative Models of Conflict Bargaining

NSCC/SA：合作研究：冲突谈判替代模型的实验分析

• 批准号: 0904795
• 负责人: Charles Holt
• 金额: $ 13.75万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2014-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0904795&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSCC; SA; Collaborative; Research; Experimental

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense. The application of bargaining models to the study of interstate conflict has produced a large number of insights regarding why states fight, but it leaves unsolved the puzzle as to why rational leaders would choose conflict if fighting incurs costs they could avoid in a negotiated settlement. Most bargaining models of conflict assume leaders are perfectly sensitive to expected costs and benefits, and as a result, they do not make decision errors. This project explores a bargaining model in which players are not assumed to be perfect decision makers, nor to believe their opponents are perfect decision makers. Instead, leaders are assumed to be somewhat insensitive to expected costs and benefits and have beliefs about regarding the insensitivity of their opponents. As a result, players may make mistakes in the way they play and may exhibit suboptimal behavior relative to the predictions of standard game theory. A set of laboratory experiments will be undertaken to evaluate the extent to which such a model can explain the types of decision errors and suboptimal outcomes that occur experimentally. Experiments will also examine the consequences of having players trained in leadership and how large expected payoffs (high stakes) influence decision making.

该奖项由国家安全、冲突与合作的社会和行为维度竞赛资助，该竞赛是国家科学基金会和国防部的联合项目。讨价还价模型在国家间冲突研究中的应用已经产生了大量关于国家为何战斗的见解，但它留下了一个未解决的谜题：如果战斗带来了他们可以在谈判解决中避免的成本，为什么理性的领导人会选择冲突。大多数冲突讨价还价模型都假设领导者对预期成本和收益非常敏感，因此他们不会犯决策错误。该项目探索了一种讨价还价模型，其中玩家不被假设为完美的决策者，也不相信他们的对手是完美的决策者。相反，领导人被认为对预期成本和收益有些不敏感，并且相信对手的不敏感。因此，玩家可能会在玩游戏的方式上犯错误，并且可能会表现出相对于标准博弈论预测的次优行为。将进行一组实验室实验来评估这种模型可以在多大程度上解释实验中发生的决策错误和次优结果的类型。实验还将检验让玩家接受领导力培训的后果，以及预期回报（高风险）对决策的影响有多大。