Collaborative Research: CT-T: Adaptive Security and Separation in Reconfigurable Hardware

合作研究：CT-T：可重构硬件中的自适应安全和分离

• 批准号: 0524771
• 负责人: Timothy Sherwood
• 金额: $ 60.39万
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Barbara
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-08-01 至 2009-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0524771&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CT; Adaptive; Security

NSF 0524771CT-T: Collaborative Research: Adaptive Security and Separation in Reconfigurable HardwarePI: Timothy Sherwood, University of California-Santa Barbara, Cynthia Irvine, Naval Postgraduate SchoolFrom Bluetooth transceivers to the NASA Mars Rover, reconfigurable circuits have become one of the mainstays of embedded design. Combining the high computational performance of specialized circuits with the re-programmability of software, these devices are quickly becoming ubiquitous. Unfortunately, if unprotected, this reconfigurability could be exploited to disrupt critical operations, snoop on supposedly secure channels, or even to physically melt a device. However, a new approach to controlling changes to the hardware logic promises to overcome these problems. In addition, the innate malleability of this hardware presents the opportunity for hardware enforcement of adaptive security policies. For example, in an emergency, trusted individuals may need to override the nominal security policy. Thus, the reconfigurable component may provide a highly trusted mechanism for secure functionality in changing environments.This research aims to close a gaping security hole in our nation's information infrastructure by enhancing the logical structure and internal management of reconfigurable hardware to enforce a dynamic information protection policy. Specifically, this research will: (1) discover hardware synthesis and static validation methods that will ensure that only secure and non-destructive configurations can be loaded, (2) develop new reconfigurable structures capable of securely mediating run-time access to shared resources through the use of hardware-compiled formal access policy languages, and (3) establish a firm foundation for trustworthy dynamic policy enforcement through ontological analysis, formal modeling and the development of management mechanisms integrating the results of the first two activities.

NSF 0524771CT-T：协作研究：可重新配置的Hardwarepi的自适应安全和分离：Timothy Sherwood，加利福尼亚大学 - 圣塔芭芭拉大学，辛西娅·欧文（Cynthia Irvine），海军后毕业生从蓝色蓝牙传输者到纳萨·马尔斯（NASA Mars）的训练，已成为一个固定式循环。将专用电路的高计算性能与软件的重新编程性相结合，这些设备迅速变得无处不在。不幸的是，如果未受保护，则可以利用这种可重构性来破坏关键操作，在据称安全的频道上窥探，甚至可以物理融化设备。 但是，一种控制硬件逻辑更改的新方法有望克服这些问题。 此外，此硬件的先天锻造性为执行适应性安全策略的硬件实施提供了机会。 例如，在紧急情况下，值得信赖的个人可能需要覆盖名义安全政策。因此，可重新配置的组件可以为不断变化的环境中的安全功能提供高度信任的机制。本研究的目的是通过增强可重新配置硬件的逻辑结构和内部管理来强制执行动态信息保护政策，以弥合国家信息基础架构中的安全漏洞。具体而言，这项研究将：（1）发现硬件合成和静态验证方法，将确保可以加载安全且无损的配置，（2）开发可将硬件访问的正式访问策略语言和（3）建立企业的建立型制造的企业来开发的，能够安全地介导共享资源的运行时访问共享资源，并建立（3），（3）整合前两个活动结果的机制。