Authority, Responsibility and Incentives in Hierarchies

等级制度中的权力、责任和激励

• 批准号: 9209455
• 负责人: Dilip Mookherjee
• 金额: $ 7.34万
• 依托单位: National Opinion Research Center
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-08-01 至 1996-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9209455&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Authority; Responsibility; Incentives; Hierarchies

This project attempts to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing different aspects of the internal organization structure of large firms, as well as of contractual nexuses among firms. Particular aspects analyzed include: hierarchical delegation of authority to design (sub)contracts, the breadth and depth of hierarchies, planning and supervision activities of managers, organizational diseconomies of scale, transfer pricing mechanisms, and the grouping of activities into different divisions. The approach adopted is to suppose that information regarding cost and market conditions is dispersed among different agents in the organization, and that they can communicate with one another in a restricted manner. Managers act strategically with respect to their private information. The organization is thus characterized by a decentralized decision-making mechanism which strikes a balance between the advantages of adaption to location information, and the disadvantage of control losses arising from managerial incentive problems. The short-term goal of the research is to develop consistent theoretical models of the above mentioned aspects of organizational structure. In the long run these models should generate predictions regarding the connection between organizational structure, and more fundamental characteristics such as the nature of technology, information structure, production scale, product demand, and product market competition.

该项目试图开发一个理论框架来分析大公司内部组织结构的不同方面以及公司之间的合同关系。 分析的具体方面包括：设计（分）合同的层级授权、层级的广度和深度、管理者的规划和监督活动、组织规模不经济、转让定价机制以及将活动分组到不同部门。 所采用的方法是假设有关成本和市场状况的信息分散在组织中的不同代理之间，并且他们可以以有限的方式相互通信。 管理者对其私人信息采取战略性行动。 因此，该组织的特点是分散的决策机制，在适应位置信息的优点和管理激励问题引起的控制损失的缺点之间取得了平衡。 研究的短期目标是为组织结构的上述方面开发一致的理论模型。 从长远来看，这些模型应该能够预测组织结构与技术性质、信息结构、生产规模、产品需求和产品市场竞争等更基本特征之间的联系。