Authority, Responsibility and Incentives in Hierarchies

等级制度中的权力、责任和激励

• 批准号: 9209455
• 负责人: Dilip Mookherjee
• 金额: $ 7.34万
• 依托单位: National Opinion Research Center
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-08-01 至 1996-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9209455&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Authority; Responsibility; Incentives; Hierarchies

This project attempts to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing different aspects of the internal organization structure of large firms, as well as of contractual nexuses among firms. Particular aspects analyzed include: hierarchical delegation of authority to design (sub)contracts, the breadth and depth of hierarchies, planning and supervision activities of managers, organizational diseconomies of scale, transfer pricing mechanisms, and the grouping of activities into different divisions. The approach adopted is to suppose that information regarding cost and market conditions is dispersed among different agents in the organization, and that they can communicate with one another in a restricted manner. Managers act strategically with respect to their private information. The organization is thus characterized by a decentralized decision-making mechanism which strikes a balance between the advantages of adaption to location information, and the disadvantage of control losses arising from managerial incentive problems. The short-term goal of the research is to develop consistent theoretical models of the above mentioned aspects of organizational structure. In the long run these models should generate predictions regarding the connection between organizational structure, and more fundamental characteristics such as the nature of technology, information structure, production scale, product demand, and product market competition.

该项目试图开发一个理论框架，用于分析大型公司内部组织结构的不同方面以及公司之间合同的联系。 分析的特定方面包括：设计（子）合同的授权，等级和深度的阶级和深度，管理人员的计划和监督活动，规模的组织不经济，转移定价机制以及将活动分组为不同的部门。 采用的方法是假设有关成本和市场状况的信息在组织的不同代理之间分散，并且他们可以以受限的方式相互交流。 管理人员在其私人信息方面进行战略行动。 因此，该组织的特征是分散的决策机制，该机制在适应性信息的优势与位置信息的优势之间取得了平衡，以及由管理激励问题引起的控制损失的缺点。 该研究的短期目标是开发组织结构上述方面的一致理论模型。 从长远来看，这些模型应该对组织结构之间的联系以及更基本特征（例如技术，信息结构，生产规模，产品需求和产品市场竞争的性质）产生预测。