Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior

拍卖中的卖家和异质竞标者：不合作和串通的战略行为

• 批准号: 8708615
• 负责人: Robert Marshall
• 金额: $ 18.29万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-11-15 至 1990-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8708615&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Sellers; Heterogeneous; Bidders; Auctions; Non

Most of the existing research on auctions has been conducted within a non-cooperative framework with homogeneous risk neutral bidders where the risk neutral auctioneer can announce a reserve price. The contribution of this project comes from working in the relatively unexplored areas of heterogeneous bidders and bidder collusion. This research is motivated by observed behavior at auctions such as nested buyer ring formation, non-inclusive rings and lift-lining (phantom bidding) by auctioneers. The previous work explained the generation of phantom bids by practicing English auctions and the durability of bidder collusion. Further research is needed to generalize these results to more complex and realistic environments and to study other aspects of auctions. The high quality of the investigators' past research shows that they have the ability to do the work. The project investigates the behavior of heterogeneous bidders and the auctioneer at first price, Dutch, and second price auctions. Distributional information regarding bidders is usually unknown by the seller, so the processing of bid data by a Bayesian auctioneer and consequent strategic behavior are explored. The project explains why only all inclusive bidder coalitions are viable at first price and Dutch auctions and why coalitions of all sizes are observed at English auctions. The project investigates if certain bidder types are either undesirable to, or, unwilling to join a coalition in an English auction. Finally, the project explains how bidder coalitions try to avoid the incentive problems created by sharing the gains of coalition formation. Both simultaneous and sequential game models are used to study nesting of bidder coalitions and other ways of efficiently sharing the gains.

大多数现有的拍卖研究都是在非合作框架内进行的，其中风险中性的投标人是同质的，风险中性的拍卖师可以宣布底价。 该项目的贡献来自于在相对未开发的异质投标人和投标人串通领域的工作。 这项研究的动机是观察拍卖中的行为，例如拍卖师的嵌套买家圈形成、非包容性圈和电梯衬里（虚拟投标）。 之前的工作通过英国拍卖的实践和投标人串通的持久性解释了虚假投标的产生。 需要进一步的研究将这些结果推广到更复杂和现实的环境，并研究拍卖的其他方面。 调查人员过去的研究质量很高，表明他们有能力完成这项工作。 该项目调查了不同投标人和拍卖师在第一价格拍卖、荷兰式拍卖和第二价格拍卖中的行为。 卖方通常不知道有关投标人的分布信息，因此探讨了贝叶斯拍卖师对投标数据的处理以及随后的策略行为。 该项目解释了为什么只有包容各方的投标人联盟在第一价格和荷兰式拍卖中才可行，以及为什么在英国拍卖中观察到各种规模的联盟。 该项目调查某些类型的投标人是否不受欢迎或不愿意加入英国拍卖联盟。 最后，该项目解释了投标人联盟如何试图避免因分享联盟形成的收益而产生的激励问题。 同时和顺序博弈模型都用于研究投标人联盟的嵌套以及其他有效分享收益的方式。