Measured total factor productivity (TFP) fell in Spain during the boom years of 1995–2007. Using administrative data from the quasi‐universe of firms, we show that there was an increase in misallocation, which was more severe in sectors where connections with public officials are more important for business success. We write and estimate a simple model of cronyism in which heterogeneous firms invest in political connections. Our quantitative exercise concludes that the institutional decline over this period costed 1.9% growth in TFP per year and a 0.8% annual increase in the resources spent by firms in establishing political connections.
在1995 - 2007年的繁荣时期,西班牙的全要素生产率(TFP)测算值下降。利用来自近乎所有企业的行政数据,我们表明资源错配现象有所增加,在那些与政府官员的关系对企业成功更为重要的行业中,这种情况更为严重。我们编写并估算了一个简单的任人唯亲模型,在该模型中,不同的企业对政治关系进行投资。我们的量化研究得出结论:在此期间,制度的衰退导致全要素生产率每年增长损失1.9%,企业用于建立政治关系的资源每年增加0.8%。